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A PRECARIOUS QUEST FOR TRUTH 
Kimberly Grambo 
I.  FAKE NEWS AND THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 
The years following the 2016 American Presidential election forced a 
reckoning with the role that misinformation played in our country’s 
increasing political polarization.  Today, consumers of online news media 
are still confronted with a seemingly impossible task: mitigating the effects of 
fake news without excessively burdening free speech.  “Fake news” is an 
inherently mischievous sub-genre of a broader category of misinformation.  
Specifically, some psychologists and social scientists define it as one that 
“mimics the output of the news media in form, but not in organizational 
process or intent—e.g., lacking editorial norms and processes to weed out the 
untrue in favor of the true.”1  As a result of several economic and 
psychological qualities intrinsic to the dissemination of information online, 
this new sub-genre of misinformation is powerful at shaping public opinion, 
as the sensationalist rhetoric of the 2016 election evidenced.2  
Fake news stories have not been limited to political topics, however.  
From merely biased coverage to utter fabrications, a wide variety of 
misinformation packaged as “news,” has impacted religious, ethnic, and 
racial groups whose identities are wrapped up in our increasing national 
polarization.3 
 
  Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 21.  University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. 2019; University of Michigan, B.A. 2012.  Special thanks to 
Professor Seth Kreimer for his guidance on this project, and to my family for their patience and 
support.   
 1 Gordon Pennycook & David Rand, Who Falls for Fake News? The Roles of Bullshit Receptivity, 
Overclaiming, Familiarity, and Analytic Thinking, J. PERSONALITY (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023545. 
 2 See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON 
PERSP. 211, 212, 230 (debating whether fake news actually influenced the ultimate outcome of the 
election but offering evidence of a strong polarizing effect). 
 3 Steven Seidenberg, Lies and Libel: Fake News is Just False, but Its Cure May Not Be So Simple, ABA J., July 
2017, at 48.  
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When the World Economic Forum convened in early 2017 to address 
fake news, the conversation was not limited to electoral politics or insidious 
foreign influence.  It approached the issue as a more encompassing crisis of 
global human rights, of which the threat to the democratic process is but one 
part.4  When fake news stories spread false narratives about vulnerable 
minority groups, an entirely different set of questions arises relating to the 
balance between First Amendment rights and threats to public order.   
Fake news that spreads misinformation about minority groups may be 
construed as a form of group defamation, which many countries around the 
world place within the reach of government oversight, sometimes even 
through criminal law.5  Critically, the United States tends to shy away from 
“hate speech laws,” as a concept, but in the context of fake news, culpability 
stems less from contempt for the creator’s expressive intent and more from 
its effect.6  Fake news that falsely and negatively portrays a particular ethnic, 
racial, or religious group has the power to impute a “terrible criminality.”7  
It implies an unworthiness of citizenship or even dehumanizes individual 
members of those groups.  History is littered with violent examples 
demonstrating why society should aim to prevent these effects.  
“Group defamation” laws of the type upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois8 have fallen out of favor in the United States since the 
1950s, but several other countries have recently relied on similar laws to curb 
the effects of non-political fake news.  In response to fake news that has stirred 
up animosity towards recently arrived immigrant populations, Germany 
recently expanded its existing group defamation laws to include liability for 
intermediaries such as Google and Facebook.9  In a more extreme example, 
 
 4 Alison Griswold, The World Economic Forum is Treating Fake News as an Urgent Matter of Global Human 
Rights, QUARTZ (Jan. 25, 2017), https://qz.com/889506/world-economic-forum-davos-fake-
news-facebook/.  Of course, the integrity of democratic institutions and free media are collectively 
a part of the broader landscape of human rights enshrined in international human rights treaties 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).  See generally Louis Henkin, Group Defamation and International 
Law, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
LANGUAGE AND VIOLENCE 123, 126–128 (Freedman ed., 1995).  
 5 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 39–41 (2012). 
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. at 45–47.  
 8 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); see infra Part II (discussing the reasons behind this shift).  
 9 Katy O’Donnell, Germany’s New Online Hate Speech Code Pushes Big Fines and Debate, POLITICO (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/hate-speech-germany-twitter-facebook-google-fines/.  
German officials in the summer of 2018 blamed “fake news” on social media for “helping to stoke 
rioting” after a German man was allegedly killed by asylum seekers from Iraq and Syria.  See Jamie 
Dettmer, German Officials: ‘Fake News’ Helped Stoke Anti-Migrant Riot, VOICE OF AM. (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.voanews.com/a/german-officials-fake-news-helped-stoke-anti-migrant-
riot/4549276.html. At points, the right-wing anti-migrant protest gathered over 5,000 participants, 
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amidst increased ethnic violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, political 
leaders have been defending draconian defamation laws under the guise that 
they are necessary to curb fake news relating to the violence.10  
Though the American collective consciousness seems primarily focused 
on the political ramifications of fake news, stories that inflict dignitary harm 
on individual members of minority groups are also of great concern to the 
national welfare.  However, addressing non-political fake news would involve 
novel First Amendment questions as to the public’s capacity to inoculate itself 
against fake news in the absence of regulation and alternatively, the 
government’s ability to properly administer a solution to the problem.  
This Comment will assess multiple approaches to regulating non-political 
fake news from a First Amendment perspective, with a passive approach 
embracing gradual inoculation on one end of the spectrum, to an active 
approach focused on criminal group libel at the other.  However, ideology 
and abstract legal doctrine alone do not necessarily point to the best answer 
in practice, especially where it pertains to an outcome-oriented goal like the 
protection of vulnerable minority groups from campaigns of hatred.  The 
lessons of the past and modern practical concerns indicate that even if legally 
justifiable, active approaches are less-attractive solutions than passive ones.  
Yet, this Comment ultimately concludes that neither approach is likely to 
succeed absent public reckoning with the new values of a “post-truth” 
America.  
II.  IDAHO AND THE DOMESTIC THREAT 
In 2016, residents of Twin Falls, Idaho were invited via Facebook to join 
an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rally in their small town.  The event sought 
to protest a “huge upsurge of violence towards American citizens” by Muslim 
refugees settled there.11  Forty-eight Facebook users indicated that they were 
 
described by observers to have been “hunting down certain groups and calling for vigilante justice.” 
Id.  
 10 Antoni Slodkowski, Myanmar Mulls Change To Law Seen As Violating Free Speech: Suu Kyi, REUTERS (July 
6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-military-journalists/myanmar-mulls-
change-to-law-seen-as-violating-free-speech-suu-kyi-idUSKBN19R0GV; see also Rohingya Crisis: Suu 
Kyi Says ‘Fake News Helping Terrorists,’ BBC (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
41170570 (“Myanmar’s de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi has claimed that the crisis in Rakhine 
state is being distorted by a ‘huge iceberg of misinformation.’”).  
 11 See Scott Shane, Purged Facebook Page Tied to the Kremlin Spread Anti-Immigrant Bile, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/politics/russia-facebook-
election.html?_r=0; see also Kevin Poulsen et. al., Exclusive: Russia Used Facebook Events to Organize Anti-
Immigrant Rallies on U.S. Soil, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-russia-used-facebook-events-to-organize-anti-
immigrant-rallies-on-us-soil.  
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“interested” in attending.12  Four live humans, mobilized by fears for the 
safety of their town, actually appeared.13  Yet the invitations, and the event 
that they advertised, were fake.  Not only did they originate from accounts 
in Russia rather than from concerned neighbors in Idaho but, on a more 
fundamental level, the march it advertised addressed a threat rooted in and 
cultivated by fake news in and of itself. 
As with many of the fake news articles that have circled American news 
feeds, the story that instigated this debacle held a grain of truth, albeit a small 
one.14  This grain of truth betrays a core tenet of fake news: it roots itself in 
an existing rumor, partisan conflict or, as in this case, a brooding, fear-based 
prejudice.  In Twin Falls, the thread began with the government refugee-
resettlement program and growing sentiment that the government was 
prioritizing and protecting outsiders to the detriment of long-time residents 
of the town.15  Then came reports and eventually charges of “lewd and 
lascivious behavior” brought by local law enforcement against a five-year-
old American child by seven- and ten-year-old Muslim immigrant boys in a 
public laundry room.  Fake news reports infected with xenophobic rhetoric 
by anti-Islam websites like “Jihad Watch” began cropping up on social 
media.16  By the time Breitbart News arrived on the scene, its reporter had 
supposedly been sent to cover the “Islamic takeover” of the town by Syrian 
refugees.  The assault had been covered as a “horrific gang rape” 
downplayed by local officials accused of being “Shariah supporters.”17  In 
reality, New York Times journalist Caitlin Dickerson reported that no 
Syrians had ever been resettled in Twin Falls, and police and parents had 
swiftly and privately dealt with the original isolated incident in the laundry 
room between three children.18  
While the implication of foreign influence embedded in the origins of 
anti-immigrant march invitations on Facebook is alarming, perhaps more 
frightening is how effectively those fictional stories laid the foundation for the 
fabricated rally to be taken seriously.  Recently, fake news relating to the 
“Migrant Caravan” of primarily Honduran asylum seekers traveling to the 
Mexican-American border in October of 2018 exemplify how the overlay of 
fake news can obfuscate our collective perception of an actual security 
 
 12 Poulsen et. al., supra note 11. 
 13 Id.  
 14 Caitlin Dickerson, How Fake News Turned a Small Town Upside Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2ypNiAh.  
 15 Id. at 9. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. 
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threat.19  It is unclear the degree to which fake news informed the Trump 
Administration’s unprecedented but largely unquestioned declaration that it 
would send over 5,000 active-duty troops to support Customs and Border 
Patrol in late November 2018.20  However, prior to the deployment, the 
President had declared a “national emergency” at the border, but only after 
retweeting several debunked news stories alleging that “Middle Eastern” 
terrorists were among the caravan, which suggests that fake news may have 
played some role in his assessment of the situation.21  Meanwhile, on-site 
organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union lambasted the gross 
qualitative and quantitative overestimation of the threat actually posed by 
the caravan, declaring the decision to deploy military forces a “huge waste of 
taxpayer money” that would only “further terrorize and militarize our 
border communities.”22   
Beyond what this episode says about the complexities of national security 
under the current administration, a larger statement can be made about fake 
news as a foundation for public manipulation.  Particularly where targeted 
misinformation seeks to demonize a segment of the population, these 
episodes illustrate how quickly the transition from a digital mob to a real one 
can occur.23  
 
 19 Emily Dreyfuss, Alert: Don’t Believe Everything You Read About the Migrant Caravan, WIRED (Oct. 23, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/mexico-migrant-caravan-misinformation-alert/.  
 20  Manuela Tobias, How Many Troops Has Donald Trump Sent to the U.S. Border So Far?, POLITIFACT, 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/nov/15/eric-
swalwell/how-many-troops-has-donald-trump-sent-us-border/ (“As of Nov. 14, about 5,900 active 
duty troops have been sent in addition to about 2,100 National Guardsmen. The Defense 
Department anticipates the number to fluctuate between 5,500 and 7,000.”). 
 21 Meegan Vazquez, Trump’s Making the Migrant Caravan a Political Issue. Here are the Facts, CNN POLITICS 
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/22/politics/donald-trump-migrant-caravan-
fact-check/index.html.  It should be noted that the U.S. intelligence community had been 
considering mass Central American migration to the United States as a threat to national security 
since the Obama administration.  Nolan Rappaport, Intelligence Community Views Migration from Central 
America as a Threat to National Security, HILL (Feb. 4, 2019).  However, the import of the decision to 
engage the “largest U.S. active-duty mobilization along the U.S.-Mexico boundary in decades” one 
week before U.S. midterm elections, viewed in light of the President’s quickly debunked tweets 
about the Caravan’s links to Islamic terrorism should not be understated.  Dan Lamothe & Nick 
Miroff, U.S. will deploy 5,200 Additional Troops to the Mexican Border, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 
29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-prepares-
large-troop-deployment-to-deter-migrant-caravan/2018/10/29/e13a360e-db84-11e8-b732-
3c72cbf131f2_story.html.  
 22 ACLU Comment on Trump Administration Sending Army to Southern Border, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-comment-trump-administration-sending-army-
southern-border.  
 23 Nina Mast, In Urban Sweden and Heartland America, Xenophobic Fake News Looks the Same, SALON (Jan. 2, 
2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/01/02/in-urban-sweden-and-heartland-america-
xenophobic-fake-news-looks-the-same_partner/. For proposed solutions, see, generally, Nicky 
Wolf, How to Solve Facebook’s Fake News Problem: Experts Pitch Their Ideas, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2016), 
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Dissenting in Abrams v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
mused that governmental regulation of speech under the First Amendment 
is “an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”24  Holmes radically envisioned 
an evolving and responsive approach to speech, in acknowledgement that 
some cases will test the comfort of the American people and the judiciary.  In 
line with that experimental approach, Holmes continued: “we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death,” with the caveat of course, 
“unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful 
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save 
the country.”25  Holmes identified a tipping point of urgency, beyond which 
government intervention through criminal sanction is not only justifiable, but 
necessary.  In 1919, when he wrote his famous dissent in Abrams, Holmes did 
not believe that point had been surpassed when several Russian nationals 
had distributed anti-capitalist pamphlets violating the Espionage Act.26  
Given the unpredictable landscape of social news media today, it remains to 
be seen whether fake news that foments animosity towards religious, ethnic, 
or racial groups can and will “threaten immediate interference with the 
lawful and pressing purposes of the law” that would justify a government 
response from his foundational perspective.27  There is no better time to 
revisit Holmes’ tipping point than today, amidst a technological and 
informational revolution that presents equally unprecedented opportunities 
for growth and devastation.  
 As of now, however, the Supreme Court seems relatively unconcerned 
with “devastation,” and far more excited about “growth,” at least as it 
pertains to freedom of speech online.  In 2017, it made one of its first 
pronouncements on the First Amendment implications of social media 
regulation, in the case of Packingham v. North Carolina.28  “Today, one of the 
most important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social 
media,” Justice Kennedy noted, before striking down a statute that would 
have severely restricted access to social media sites by sexual predators.29  
The opinion was openly hesitant to legislative restrictions on this new 
frontier: “[T]he Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/29/facebook-fake-news-problem-experts-
pitch-ideas-algorithms.  
 24 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).   
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. at 630–31. 
 27 Id. at 630.  
 28 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017). 
 29 Id.  
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the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in 
that medium,” Justice Kennedy warned, with five justices behind him.30   
While he was addressing access to the internet more broadly, and not 
constitutional protections for online content, Kennedy’s deferential 
approach to a liberated internet is consistent with the Court’s trend over the 
last century of preferring a free marketplace of ideas to a government-
regulated one.  It indicates the Court’s strong position that the freedom of 
the media online is highly valued.  
This Comment will thus address the likelihood that the judiciary will 
leave the fake news problem to information consumers to solve, while 
keeping in mind that economic, sociological, and psychological 
considerations of false content and online media are more complex than any 
threat to the marketplace ever seen before.  It will use the Court’s most recent 
pronouncement regarding a passive approach to truth-seeking under the 
First Amendment in United States v. Alvarez as a model for analysis.31  However, 
given the unique character of fake news on social media, Alvarez’s passive 
approach poses ideological and practical problems.  Additionally, it raises 
historically-rooted suspicions of government intervention in news media, 
particularly when Holmes’ tipping point becomes a call for an “immediate 
check” on dangerous speech.32  
III.  FALSE SPEECH IN AN UNFREE MARKETPLACE 
While there may be little in the way of Supreme Court precedent 
regarding social media law and the First Amendment as of yet, the courts 
have often addressed the subject of false speech.  Another idea put forth by 
Justice Holmes in his Abrams dissent has shaped First Amendment 
jurisprudence on “truth” in the last century, that “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”33  It is a useful maxim, in that it smartly excuses the courts from 
having to wade into the murky waters of separating the true from the false in 
discussions of First Amendment values.  Underlying this statement, however, 
is a questionable assumption: that each thought subject to the protection of 
First Amendment protection “plays the market” fairly.  In a complex 
framework like social media, where algorithms and clicks guide competition 
of ideas, the metaphor feels outdated.  It exposes a dangerous flaw in a 
 
 30 Id.  Meanwhile, Justice Alito indicated his hesitance to extend unfettered protection in this area, in 
contrast to the fervor of the majority: “The Court is unable to resist musings that seem to equate 
the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.”  Id. at 1738 (Alito, J. concurring).  
 31 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 32 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 33 Id.  
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“hands-off” approach to fake news and calls into question whether the 
information consumer will be able to sort true from false news online without 
intervention.  
Despite being almost one hundred years old, the “marketplace of ideas” 
justification for protecting false speech persists into the age of the internet.  
More recently, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Alvarez 
defended the merits of a general constitutional protection for false factual 
statements, citing “the common understanding that some false statements are 
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public 
and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to 
guarantee.”34  
In Alvarez, the Court reviewed under strict scrutiny whether the Stolen 
Valor Act of 2005 was narrowly tailored enough to actually achieve a 
compelling state interest in “protecting the integrity of the military honors 
system.”35  This involved an analysis of the causal link between defendant 
Alvarez’s admittedly false claim that he had won a medal of honor and the 
subsequent dilution of the honor itself, and whether counter-speech might 
also achieve the Act’s purpose.36  Critically, the Court attacked the 
Government’s failure to show that unchallenged claims under the act 
actually “undermine the public’s perception of the military and the integrity 
of its awards system.”37  It also posited that a readily accessible database 
(perhaps online) of recipients of the Medal of Honor would be a less 
restrictive means of remedying the factual error.38  These two criticisms 
reiterated the Court’s century-old belief that the marketplace of ideas would 
and could correct itself as to Mr. Alvarez’s lie about the Medal of Honor, and 
that government interference was unnecessary here. 
Of course, the stakes in Alvarez were of a different magnitude than those 
stemming from a worldwide epidemic of fake news and ethnic, racial, and 
religious polarization.  That is, fake news implicates a more complex ratio of 
 
 34 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)).  But see 
Alan K. Chan & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 1435, 1443 (2015) (“The Supreme Court has long suggested that ‘there is no such thing as a 
false idea,’ premised on the notion that truth is optimally derived from free and open discourse, 
including the rebuttal and challenge of even the most outrageous or ‘false’ ideas or beliefs. 
Untruthful statements of fact are another matter, because they are said to neither advance public 
discourse nor promote individual self-realization.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974)).  
 35 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 725. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 728.  
 38 Id. at 729.  
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value to harm.39  In 1942, the Supreme Court, in deciding Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, delineated several categories of speech as “utterances [that] are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”40  While this list has 
since evolved, false statements as a generalized category are still not 
considered by the Supreme Court to be “low value” forms of speech 
requiring policing.  As such, the facts at issue in Alvarez allowed the Court to 
easily sweep the plaintiff’s pointless lies into the bin of benign speech having 
no value, but also no harm.  Rather than correcting these statements through 
legislation, the marketplace of ideas could take it from there; information 
consumers could google Alvarez’s name and correct the lie, the medal of 
honor would retain its integrity, and no further intervention would be 
required. 
Alvarez must be distinguished on two dimensions, however, when 
assessing the appropriateness of the passive, marketplace of ideas approach 
applied there as a solution to the fake news problem.  First, for the purposes 
of the Chaplinsky “value” assessment, news organizations occupy a special 
place under the First Amendment, though there is yet no wholesale 
exemption from liability for the media.41  This complex landscape should be 
contrasted with the narrower inquiry relating to petitioner Mr. Alvarez as a 
private individual lying for personal gain.  The extent of the media privilege 
is a nuanced one, with absolute protections for political criticism and from 
prior restraint on one end of the spectrum, and the ever-shrinking but 
 
 39 Id. at 717 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).  In his majority opinion in 
Alvarez, Justice Kennedy rejected the concept of a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage” 
based on “ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”  Id. at 717.  Rather, he 
acknowledged that certain content-based restrictions on speech may be allowed where they are 
historically rooted, for example, the familiar categories of fighting words and obscenity.  Id. 
 40 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  The Chaplinsky list has evolved over the 
years to include exceptions that the court had not yet considered in 1942, including fraud and child 
pornography.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment also protects 
“commercial speech”).  Subsequent refinements to the categorical approach as a framework aside, 
(namely R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)) the conceptual evaluation was still relied on 
by the court as of Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717–18. 
 41 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The need to avoid self-censorship by the 
news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would have 
embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation.”); cf. GRUNDGESETZ [GG I][BASIC LAW], 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0026. In 
Germany, “when cases present facts in which human dignity and free speech collide, free speech 
usually must give way.”  Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: 
Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as A Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1553–54 (2004). “The First Amendment, by way of contrast, makes no 
provision for rights balancing; on its face, the right to free speech is absolute.”  Id.  
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persistent availability of malicious libel liability for defamation of non-public 
figures on the other.42  Yet, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged the 
unique danger restrictions on news organizations pose to society.  Namely, 
the expressive nature of publication and its democratic, truth-seeking, 
discourse-stimulating value to information consumers is fundamental to the 
American way of life.43  
Second, Alvarez should be distinguished from the fake news inquiry in that 
it was the first time that the court had addressed a measure that sought to 
criminalize falsity alone without regard to the harm it causes.  Kennedy is 
careful to differentiate the facts in Alvarez from defamation, for example, 
where there is other “legally cognizable harm associated with a false 
statement.”44  
Interestingly, despite that “false statements” are not on the list of 
categorical, tradition-backed exceptions to full First Amendment protection 
stemming from Chaplinsky, the narrower, common-law-rooted category of 
defamation still appeared on Kennedy’s updated list in his 2012 Alvarez 
opinion.45 The precarious relationship between defamation law and the 
modern First Amendment will be discussed later in this analysis, particularly 
the qualified nature of Kennedy’s reference to defamation as a category 
receiving diminished constitutional protection.46  However, for the time 
being, it suffices to forecast that the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the 
marketplace of ideas as a justification for protecting false speech might be 
inapplicable where that false speech attaches unique societal values, or is 
particularly harmful.  
Evaluation of a hands-off approach to fake news encapsulates precisely 
that scenario: an intersection of “freedom of the press” values and harm to 
the peace or to individuals or groups within society.  The spread and effects 
of fake news are predicated on a social platform that challenges many 
 
 42 See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52 (“Every freeman has an undoubted 
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of 
the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence 
of his own temerity.”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713–714 (1931) (claiming a statute 
allowing public authorities to file suit against publishers for “defamatory matter” forms the “essence 
of censorship”).  
 43 More specifically, while the court succinctly ponders the chilling effects of regulating private false 
speech in Alvarez, chilling effects on news organizations may be particularly of issue for these 
purposes. 567 U.S. at 716; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340–42; Near, 283 U.S. at 713–15; N.Y. Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).  These chilling effects and efforts to mitigate them 
will be discussed further in Part III.  
 44 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718–19. 
 45 Id. at 717.  
 46 Current reservations on the application of the categorical approach to defamation, such as 
developments after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in libel law under the First 
Amendment, will be discussed infra Part III.  
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traditional assumptions about the way that the citizenry engages with new 
information.47  These assumptions formed the basis for a theory of First 
Amendment protection for false factual statements that may no longer apply.  
Yet, on the other side, the Court’s fear of censoring or even chilling any 
slightly less objectionable media (particularly online, as referenced in 
Packingham) presents a compelling counterargument to government 
intervention.48  In 2012, the Supreme Court confidently rejected the 
Government’s attempts to criminalize false speech in Alvarez, again putting 
its faith in the power of the marketplace of ideas.  However, the unique 
nature of the fake-news epidemic presents an altogether different case, both 
in the value of the speech to society, and in the harm that it causes.49 
A.  The Value of Fake News 
In contrast to the petty lies at issue in Alvarez, fake news stories defaming 
minority groups can be more socially destructive, making reliance on the 
corrective power of the marketplace of ideas more dubious.  To illustrate, a 
study of the most popular election articles in the three months leading up to 
the 2016 United States presidential election found that the top twenty fake 
news stories had more engagement (shares, reactions, and comments) on 
Facebook than the top twenty articles from major news outlets.50  Beyond 
highlighting the sheer magnitude of the problem, this study is telling for 
several other reasons.  It points to three unprecedented problems posed by 
misinformation online, as distinct from traditional forms of news media.  
First, the new incentive structures behind news production call into 
question the heightened value that media has generally enjoyed as an 
essential but rarefied outlet for informing the public.  Second, fake news is as 
resilient as “real” news and can compete in a social marketplace just as well. 
Third, the least correctable fake news stories may also hold the greatest 
potential to cause social harms.  This section will explore ways in which 
Holmes’ century-old justification for protecting false factual information fails 
to address the challenges that arise when the digital revolution, human 
psychology, and existing social tension meet.  
 
 47 See infra Part II. 
 48 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (“Foreclosing access to social media 
altogether thus prevents users from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights”). 
 49 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729–30.  
 50 Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on 
Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-
fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-
facebook?utm_term=.uwmnD8LZw#.omoYGDJye.  
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From the perspective of the First Amendment, the unique values ascribed 
to the freedom of the press, as compared to the freedoms associated with 
private speech, are changing rapidly as the lines between those two formerly 
distinct categories blur.  First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh noted in 
1995 that two of the underlying premises of the First Amendment—that to 
speak and have a platform to do so was an investment, and that, as a result, 
information consumers had a scarcity of information to consume—are 
flipped in the age of the internet.51  These understandings were bound closely 
to the conception of a free press having particular value in the marketplace 
of ideas, based on the “natural right of the members of an organized society, 
united for their common good, to impart and acquire information about 
their common interest.”52  The value acknowledged here extends beyond the 
mere assertion that the press enjoys particular freedom as the “fourth pillar” 
of American democracy and more broadly to its vital function in uncovering 
and disseminating truth to the public.  Volokh’s early assertions about the 
increased accessibility of public platforms mentioned above have arguably 
stood the test of time.  However, his subsequent prediction that the online 
revolution would only strengthen the marketplace of ideas theory may not 
have accounted for the distortive effects of social media, where anyone can 
be (or pretend to be) a journalist in righteous pursuit of truth. 
The creation and dissemination of fake news requires little to no 
investment.  Accordingly, the content in the marketplace of ideas is now 
more than what a publisher deems worthy.53  In reducing the costs to 
participate in journalism, traditional media with professional reporters, 
advertising teams, and fact-checkers face dwindling profits, while “cheap 
speech” creators (fake news “writers” among them) with startup costs 
approaching zero conversely find that the business can be extremely 
lucrative.  “If the goal is to maximize an audience (and therefore ad revenue) 
already facing a glut of down-the-middle serious news, then the trick is to 
hype and promote any kind of row to get a huge influx of partisan readers,” 
says James Ball in his 2017 book on fake news.54  “If a story is going to go 
unchecked . . . why not make it up entirely and reduce costs even further?”55  
 
 51 Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807 (1995). 
 52 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936). 
 53 See id. at 244–45, 249–50 (discussing the importance of attempts to lessen this bottleneck effect by 
removing additional barriers like excess taxes, particularly on “cheap” newspapers available to the 
masses); see also Alexander Smith & Vladimir Banic, Fake News: How a Partying Macedonian Teen Earns 
Thousands Publishing Lies, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/fake-
news-how-partying-macedonian-teen-earns-thousands-publishing-lies-n692451 (featuring an 
interview with a fake-news entrepreneur who notes that stories about Trump are his most 
profitable).  
 54  JAMES BALL, POST-TRUTH: HOW BULLSHIT CONQUERED THE WORLD 11 (2017).  
 55 Id.  
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The rise of the “attention industry,” and the growing importance of 
advertising to the news business model means that some news content is now 
created with a very different motivation than to inform the public and “seek 
truth.”56  In the world of cheap speech and fake news, informational content 
and educative effect are secondary concerns to profit margin. 
On top of this, the injection of “social” components to our news-sharing 
behaviors further complicates the values the publisher aims to maximize.  
Media scholars Charlie Beckett and Mark Deuze have attempted to 
understand modern journalism in the context of its “emotionally charged 
networked environment,” and cite economic, technological and behavioral 
factors pushing news media to change their approach to capturing audiences 
through emotional appeal.57  They note that the precious craft of modern 
news professionals is now “blended into people’s digital mobile lives 
alongside kittens, shopping, sport, music, online dating and mating rituals, 
pornography, and games,” which forces news operations to consider 
entertainment value more than ever.58  
This shift in focus has led to a body of psychological research into the 
creation of “clickbait,” or the practice of styling online articles with titles 
engineered to trigger an irresistible urge to click on them.59  A study through 
Stanford University on the motivators of Facebook content creators revealed 
that Facebook’s business model forces media sources to design content and 
headlines to elicit readers’ emotional responses.60  Journalists surveyed 
“contended that Facebook’s ad revenue business model emphasizes clickbait 
over quality content and that profit off the spread of fake news will outweigh 
incentives to effectively deal with the problem.”61  This is one of many 
reasons why resorting to intermediary regulation of fake news is unlikely to 
be widely supported among the tech companies that profit from fake news.62  
More broadly, however, forms of fake news that exploit our emotional 
responses for profit erode the traditional conception of journalism’s vital role 
in the marketplace of ideas. 
 
 56 JACOB FINKEL ET AL., FAKE NEWS AND MISINFORMATION 113 (2017), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Fake-News-Misinformation-FINAL-
PDF.pdf.  
 57 Charlie Beckett & Mark Deuze, On the Role of Emotion in the Future of Journalism, SOCIAL MEDIA + 
SOCIETY, July–Sept. 2016, at 1. 
 58 Id. at 2. 
 59 See An Emerging Science of Clickbait, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 25, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/536161/an-emerging-science-of-clickbait/ (noting a trend 
whereby “[r]esearchers are teasing apart the complex set of links between the virality of a Web 
story and the emotions it generates”). 
 60 FINKEL ET AL., supra note 56, at 33. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 88.  
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Should the Supreme Court find itself presiding over a case involving fake 
news and social media, however, it would not be the first time that economic 
and entertainment value drivers have entered the judicial calculus.  The 
Court’s early evaluation of older forms of media is instructive as to how fake 
news under the First Amendment may be treated.  In short, where the 
emotions of an audience are manipulated for profit, the degree of expressive 
intent matters.  
For example, in affirming an Ohio film-censorship law in 1915, the 
Supreme Court in Mutual Film v. Ohio held that “The exhibition of moving 
pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, 
like other spectacles, not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country, 
or as organs of public opinion.”63  Films, although “vivid, useful and 
entertaining,” were seen as being “capable of evil,” largely as a result of the 
emotive quality of their imagery.64  Film as a medium was, of course, 
eventually brought back under the governance of the First Amendment in 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, and remains there today from the modern 
acknowledgement that it can “affect public attitudes and behavior in a 
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine 
to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”65  
Yet, critically, the Court did not go so far as to extend protection beyond the 
point where “the capacity for evil” is exacted through film, instead suggesting 
that while a prior restraint on these types of media would be inappropriate, 
post-hoc controls might still be available where necessary.66 
Consistent with that caveat, the Court has been less protective of for-
profit private, but defamatory speech.  The Supreme Court has previously 
made pronouncements on defamatory speech that is made “solely in the 
individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience.”67  As it 
related to erroneous credit reports, the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss approved of a defamation suit that did not relate to issues of 
“public interest.”68   Accordingly, it did not raise quite the same expression-
 
 63 Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915). 
 64 Id.  
 65 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
 66 Id. at 502.  
 67 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985). 
 68 Id.  Whether or not fake news stories about groups relate to the public interest is another measure 
entirely, though scholars have made arguments that group libel is akin to private libel of everyday 
individuals, just on a different scale.  WALDRON, supra note 5, at 127.  Assuming that this type of 
speech would not be found to be “public speech,” the majority in Greenmoss indicates that while 
Gertz asserts that the state interest in public speech is “irrelevant,” for non-public speech, the state 
interest may be taken into consideration in a defamation suit.  Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 780 n.5 (1985) 
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–46 (1974). This distinction will be explored 
further in Part III.  
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quashing concerns associated with film censorship.69 The court refrained 
from applying the full force of First Amendment scrutiny70 where speech was 
both unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation because it is 
motivated by profit, and where it was more “objectively verifiable” than 
speech deserving of greater protection.71  
Given the myriad forms of fake news, varying from easily debunked 
clickbait (perhaps with solely economic incentives) to complex conspiracy 
theories (written by authors who truly believe them), refusing First 
Amendment protection for lack of clear informative or expressive purpose 
would not be universally appropriate, if at all.  For one, social scientists 
studying fake news take care (albeit colloquially) to differentiate “bullshitters” 
from “liars” in this context.72  While the latter cares deeply about the truth 
and seeks to subvert it with some purpose, the former is simply unconcerned 
with the truth—the “bullshit” created serves no purpose other than to 
capture the reader’s attention.73  From expressive and protected films in 
Joseph Burstyn, to entrepreneurial and unprotected credit reports in Dun & 
Bradstreet, the craft of fake news “bullshitters” may fall closer to the latter.  
This might further distinguish lying (and perhaps truly confused or deluded) 
defendants like Alvarez from professional-grade fake news entrepreneurs.  
These underlying motivations would be a consideration in some extreme 
cases, for example, where “journalists” have openly admitted to creating and 
soliciting highly deceptive content solely for attracting clicks and generating 
advertising revenue.74  
Volokh’s argument about lower barriers to entry and an increase in 
content likewise disrupts the nature of “public discourse” as understood by 
free-press absolutists, particularly in the context of fake news.  Considering 
the unique psychological mechanisms through which information about 
other racial, religious, or ethnic groups is processed, the way information 
consumers interact with content today challenges whether the assumptions 
underlying Holmes’ “search for truth” even apply to social media.  
Notably, the aforementioned statistic about how fake news fared as well 
on social media as actual news, refers to “engagement” as a measure of 
success, rather than traffic or actual readership.75  This subtle distinction 
 
 69  See supra note 63. 
 70 In this instance, the “full force” argument would indicate a requirement that a state interest be 
“substantial.”  Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 760.  
 71 Id. at 762 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–
72 n.24 (1976)). 
 72 Pennycook, supra note 1, at 39. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Planet Money: Finding the Fake-News King (Episode 739), NPR (Dec. 2, 2016) (downloaded using iTunes).  
 75 Silverman, supra note 50. 
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represents a significant change in the way that information consumers 
interact with the news.  In effect, it reveals an important aspect of fake news 
in the attention economy: where the goal is maximizing clicks, the goal of 
fake news is less to be read than to be shared.76  
These goals rebut a fundamental premise of the marketplace of ideas 
theory: that the persistence of an idea correlates to its truth. The failure of a 
news article to be read and spread today may just as well be attributed to a 
marketing and algorithmic failure as a journalistic oversight.  In addition to 
using clickbait techniques to drive revenue through clicks, the way content is 
displayed online is also subject to the new rules of the attention economy.77  
Beyond the more superficial effectiveness of clickbait science, studies on news 
sharing behaviors have shown that the psychological processes involved in 
the decision to repost a particular article on social media do not trigger 
regions of the brain used in analytic thought-processing.  Critically, as a 
result, the decision to share is less related to a belief in the accuracy of the 
article.78  Rather, in many instances, this behavior is hypothesized to be 
driven instead by concerns about reputation or virtue signaling.79 
Additionally, social media platforms have come under fire for the 
proliferation of “filter bubbles,” or echo chambers created when algorithms 
behind users’ news feeds are programmed to selectively display content in 
line with those users’ existing beliefs.80  There is conflicting evidence as to the 
consequences of these algorithms on the dissemination of fake news, with 
technology companies claiming that “the related filter-bubble effect is due to 
the user’s network and past engagement behavior – such as clicking only on 
certain news stories) that is, it is not the fault of the newsfeed algorithm but 
the choices of users themselves.”81  These studies have been challenged by 
 
 76 The most well-cited example of this is an NBC report that Macedonian teenagers were able to 
make tens of thousands of dollars creating fake news in the later stages of the U.S. election.  Smith 
& Banic, supra note 53.  This effect is not limited to electoral politics however.  See Dickerson, supra 
note 14 (highlighting how fake news outlets created an inaccurate story about an alleged sexual 
assault in a small Idaho town).  Notably, research in 2019 has shown that about 8.5% of American 
Facebook users actually shared fake news stories in 2016, a smaller percentage than expected, but 
still a staggering figure given the sheer number of Facebook users nationally.  Guess et al., Less Than 
You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination on Facebook, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (Jan. 9, 
2019), https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/1/eaau4586/tab-pdf. 
 77 Pennycook, supra note 1, at 38 (citing Jillian A. Jordan et al., Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for 
a Theory of False Signaling, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 356 (2017); Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, Evolution 
of Indirect Reciprocity (Int’l Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis, Interim Report IR-05-079, 2005), 
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7763/).  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Dominic DiFranzo & Kristine Gloria-Garcia, Filter Bubbles and Fake News, 23 XRDS MAG., April 
2017, at 33.  
 81 Id. at 33–34.  Of course, this conflicting evidence comes from a study performed by Facebook in 
2015 and should be evaluated in that context.   
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social and computer scientists who note that this attempt by technology 
giants to deflect responsibility for shaping individual opinion misses the point: 
these algorithms constitute a worrisome form of censorship, self-imposed or 
not.82  In light of the well-documented human susceptibility to false 
information in social situations, particularly that arguments from “in-group 
sources” are viewed less critically, the effects of filter bubbles make the 
likelihood of correction even lower.83  In Holmes’ view, the value of 
information depends on its contribution to discourse in the marketplace of 
ideas, and discourse requires active manipulation of ideas.84  From this 
understanding, then, extending the same First Amendment protection to 
fake news would be more difficult to justify on the basis of its meager 
contribution to an algorithmically engineered and often mindless dialogue. 
Hearkening back to early Supreme Court decisions that defended the 
unique ability for the press to “shed . . . more light on the public and business 
affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity,”85 it is 
unclear where fake news falls.  Particularly as it pertains to non-political fake 
news relating to private parties, its informational and expressive value to the 
marketplace of ideas is questionable.86  That said, in Alvarez, a mere failure 
to affirmatively add value to the marketplace was still insufficient to remove 
First Amendment protection for false speech, and additional effects must also 
be considered.87 
 
 
 82 Id. at 34. (“Specifically, [social scientist] Zeynep Tufekci rebutted many of the findings and 
methodology of the study, accusing it of under-playing its most important conclusion that the 
newsfeed algorithm decides placement of posts and this placement greatly influences what users 
click and read. Tufekci also highlighted that the sampling was not random and thus cannot be 
generalized across all Facebook users.”). 
 83 See generally Rod Bond & Peter Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s 
(1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCH. BULLETIN 111, 111–137 (1996); D.J. Flynn, et al., 
The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs about Politics, 38 
ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 129 (2017). 
 84 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 85 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). 
 86 The theory proposed by the Alvarez majority that the prevention of chilling effects is a value 
associated with the otherwise valueless speech will be addressed in Part III.   
 87 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012).  Finally, it should be noted that the insinuation 
by the Alvarez majority that the prevention of chilling effects is a value associated with the otherwise 
valueless speech will be addressed in a discussion of government intervention Part III.  Id.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, however, reducing a chill on speech will be treated as a value associated 
with declining to regulate, not a value inherent to the speech itself. 
 
1316 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
   
 
B.  The Harm of Fake News 
In addition to the value of false speech, the Court in Alvarez also 
considered its harms.88  It is not enough to simply show that some forms of 
fake news have limited informational value and fail to contribute to public 
discourse.  The Government’s failure to demonstrate that Alvarez’s lie 
damaged the military in some concrete way was critical to the court’s finding 
that the lie was protected.89  On top of the aforementioned distortionary 
effects on the marketplace of ideas itself, fake news that defames particular 
social groups obviously involves a distinct dignitary harm to those individuals 
and a harm to a peaceful society.  These are typical of the damages 
historically addressed by a criminal libel suit in particular,90 though the stakes 
with fake news and modern technology are notably higher than ever before.  
The unique medium of the social mediascape can amplify these harms 
exponentially.  
As to the effect of fake news, the aforementioned motivation to create 
content that will generate profit betrays a dangerous incentive to capitalize 
on existing social tensions if that is what audiences are psychologically 
primed to click on.  A growing body of research explores the idea that certain 
forms of fake news not only have a higher tendency to “go viral,” but are also 
more persistent in the news landscape because they are harder to debunk.91  
As such, even a “debunked” news story may still be able to turn a profit.  This 
may mean that there is no incentive to make fake news any more accurate 
than the bare minimum required for the initial click.  
Researchers at Dartmouth College have studied the effects of 
misinformation on the human psyche, and their conclusions, along with 
others in the field, have slowly narrowed in on a set of factors that perpetuate 
certain types of fake news and render corrective information less effective.92  
Some of their findings are more mechanical: for example, graphical rather 
than textual corrections to fake news stories are more persuasive.93  However, 
other findings reveal that there are powerful incentives behind the reckless 
 
 88 Id. at 725–26. 
 89 Id. at 719, 726.  
 90 Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
691, 702–703 n. 67 (“The function of [common law libel] was epitomized in the law of seditious 
libel, which punished as a crime any speech that may tend to lessen the King in the esteem of his 
subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise jealousies between him and his people.” 
(internal brackets and quotations omitted)). 
 91 See generally Flynn, supra note 83, at 130–31 (summarizing studies on the effects of misperceptions 
and corrective information over the last eight years). 
 92 Id. at 131–133.  
 93 Id. at 131.  
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creation of incendiary defamatory content, and further explain why 
information consumers struggle to sort through it all.  
In this environment, it appears that the creation of fake news that preys 
on the existing fears of a particular group may be more profitable because it 
is more likely to be engaged with, and that this type of content is less likely to 
be corrected in the long run.  “Directionally motivated reasoning” or 
“affirmation bias” here refers to a tendency of information consumers to seek 
out content that reinforces their existing preferences, whether it be partisan 
leanings or pre-formed opinions.94  This suggests a positive feedback loop for 
certain kinds of fake news: if a given group is more attracted to certain 
headlines that float around in their newsfeeds, they are more likely to click.  
To complicate matters, the entities paying for those clicks often have no 
idea what content brought their future customers to click on their online 
advertisements in the first place.  This is because a large portion of online 
advertising is automated, meaning that advertisers rarely choose where they 
place their ads; they simply bid for space on high-traffic content.95  If more 
clicks yields higher profits, this incentivizes the production of more fake news, 
especially where there is little to no human oversight. 
Contrasted with Mr. Alvarez’s easily fact-checked statement that he 
received the Medal of Honor, the research above tells us that certain types 
of fake news may be far more resilient.  Aside from indicating why some fake 
news is believable in the first place, self-affirming reasoning also tends to 
explain why, when confronted with certain types of false information, 
attempts to correct it may be less or even entirely unpersuasive.96  
More frighteningly as it pertains to fake news that stokes existing ethnic, 
racial, or religious conflicts, however, studies show that this persistence is 
particularly strong where the information relates to an identity threat.97  If 
 
 94 Id. at 132 (citing Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, Citizens’, Scientists’, and Policy Advisors Beliefs About Global 
Warming, 658 ANNALS AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 271, Mar. 2015; Charles S. Taber & Milton 
Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evalutaion of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755 (2006); Kevin J. 
Mullinix, Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue 
Importance, 38 POL. BEHAV. 383 (2016)). 
 95 Pagan Kennedy, How to Destroy the Business Model of Breitbart and Fake News, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/opinion/sunday/how-to-destroy-the-business-model-of-
breitbart-and-fake-news.html.  The New York Times reports that a campaign to expose large 
advertisers who purchase ad space on websites, like Breitbart News, that frequently peddle in false or 
misleading content that “incite violence and discrimination against minority groups” has been 
relatively effective in changing company policies, and now more advertisers than ever are more 
conscientious about where to place ads online.   
 96 Flynn, supra note 83, at 143–44. (“[C]onditions such as polarization, party cues, and others . . . lead 
to misperceptions about some (but certainly not all) political facts.”). 
 97 Garrett et al., Undermining the Corrective Effects of Media-Based Political Fact Checking? The Role of Contextual 
Cues and Naïve Theory, 63 J. COMM. 617, 620 (2013) (“Naïve theories which imply that a group, 
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people will tend to reason their way towards conclusions that “reinforce 
existing loyalties rather than conclusions that objective observers might deem 
‘correct,’” this would indicate that groups are less likely to be corrected on 
information that pertains to other “out” groups, particularly those that they 
already perceive as threatening.98  
This suggests that fake news is particularly persistent where it exploits 
existing tensions between groups, and this effect may be amplified where one 
of those groups is perceived to threaten the existing social order.99  The 
nature and popularity of anti-immigrant disinformation during the 2016 
election is an example this effect.  A 2017 study from the Berkman Klein 
Center at Harvard University noted that during the 2016 election, 
immigration was the most covered subject on social media, and that Breitbart 
News was responsible for more shared immigration content than any other 
major news source.100   Critically, however, Breitbart’s immigration stories 
were primarily framed in terms of “fear of Muslims and Islam, expressed 
both in cultural and physical security terms,” and relied less on traditional 
economic or resource-based conservative rhetoric.101  The study noted that 
while the impact of profit-driven clickbait on the election itself may have 
been minimal, more subtle “disinformation and propaganda” from partisan 
sites like Breitbart were primarily effective in “reorienting the public 
 
whether it is defined by religion, race, ideology, or something else, threatens the dominant social 
order can be particularly powerful.”). 
 98 Flynn, supra note 83 at 133 (citing Gerber, Green & Larimer, Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence 
from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33 (2008); Alan S. Gerber & Todd Rogers, 
Deceptive Social Norms and Motivations to Vote: Everybody’s Voting and So Should You, 71 J. POL. 178 (2009); 
Paluck 2011; Jonathan Meer, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Peer Pressure in Charitable Solicitation, 95 J. 
PUB. ECON. 926 (2011); Bryan Bollinger & Kenneth Gillingham, Peer Effects in the Diffusion of Solar 
Photovoltaic Panels, 31 MARKETING SCI. 900 (2012); Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person 
Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295 (2012); Felipe Kast, Stephan 
Meier & Dina Pomeranz, Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on  Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a 
Savings Commitment Device, (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 6311, 2012), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7c79/a0fc01b59924a1e2b6951cc55bd842b03a8e.pdf; 
Elizabeth L. Paluck & Hana Shepherd, The Salience of Social Referents: A Field Experiment on Collective 
Norms and Harassment Behavior in a School Social Network, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 899 
(2012), in support of the proposition that “humans are heavily influenced by their peers and social 
contacts.”).  
 99 In line with these findings, it is interesting to note that, “reminders of social difference or cues about 
outgroup membership may also reduce the effectiveness of corrections.”  Flynn, supra note 83, at 
130. 
 100 FARIS ET AL., PARTISANSHIP, PROPAGANDA & DISINFORMATION, ONLINE MEDIA & THE 2016 
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 6, 13 (2017). 
 101 Id. at 95 (The [Breitbart] headlines appear to have been designed to propagate fear of immigrants in 
general, but with a heavy Islamophobic focus. Among the top 20 most shared stories, nine 
referenced Muslims, five referenced crime or terrorism, two mentioned disease, and eight cited 
specific large numbers of immigrants.”). 
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conversation” on controversial topics.102  As it pertained to immigration, 
Breitbart was able to draw readers and amplify existing biases with mixed-
truth coverage, punchy, alarming headlines, and exploitation of existing 
stereotypes and fears.103  Given the psychology of social media sharing 
behaviors noted above and resulting incentives to create semi-true content 
that exploits identity threats, it is perhaps not a coincidence that an outlet 
using these tactics skyrocketed to the most-shared news source of the election 
in a matter of months.104 
Compared to other potential targets of fake news, minority groups are 
particularly susceptible to online defamation for the above reasons, and that 
vulnerability is easily translated into violence off-screen.  The race to the 
bottom by content creators is not new, as will be discussed with the increased 
popularity of the radio and worries about the destructive power of 
“sensationalist” media between world wars.105  However, in the new 
paradigm, where content is cheap, attention is expensive, profit margin is 
wide, and risk is zero, these effects are not only intensified—they are 
incentivized.   
For example, studies show that media coverage of immigrants is strongly 
correlated with public opinions of those populations on a macro level.106  In 
Europe, research shows that even mere overestimations about the percentage 
of the total population comprised of immigrants “are associated with anti-
immigrant attitudes and policy preferences.”107  Furthermore, social 
dynamics in opinion formation are incredibly important to the physical 
realization of hatred, with Koopmans and Olzak finding in 2004 that 
 
 102 Id. at 20. 
 103 Id. at 95. 
 104 Clare Malone, Trump Made Breitbart Great Again, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug 18, 2016), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-made-breitbart-great-again/ (detailing the meteoric 
rise of Breitbart readership in the months preceding the 2016 election, to 18 million readers or 9% 
of the market at one point).   
 105 A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, BROADCAST HYSTERIA: ORSON WELLES’S WAR OF THE WORLDS AND 
THE ART OF FAKE NEWS 226 (2017).  
 106 Hajo Boomgaarden & Rens Vleigenthart, How News Content Influences Anti-Immigration Attitudes: 
Germany, 1993–2005, 48 EUR. J. POL. RES. 516, 518–19 (2009) (“News media can influence people’s 
readiness to categorize others.  By emphasizing the ethnicity of news subjects, news media can 
contribute to a sense of in-group belonging and, accordingly, to out-group hostility.”). 
 107 Flynn, supra note 83, at 130.  This effect has been seen less clearly in the United States, with Hopkins 
et al. finding in 2017 that “perceptions of immigrant populations may be more a consequence than 
a cause of attitudes toward immigration.”  Hopkins et al., The Muted Consequences of Correct 
Information About Immigration, at 319 (June 18, 2018), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 
8nc847x1#main.  That said, the researchers did not find that this “necessarily cast doubt on the 
power threat theory writ large.”  For one, it is consistent with the hypothesis that fake news tends 
to further polarize existing beliefs, and it “simply suggests that other mechanisms are needed to 
explain why people perceive an outgroup as threatening based on its presence in a particular 
geographic context.”  Id.  
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visibility and proposed support for right-wing violence in the news actually 
correlates significantly with violence against minority ethnic groups.108  More 
recently in Germany, government officials have even conceded to the link 
between violent, far-right activity and fake news after several false stories on 
social media stoked the most severe anti-immigrant rioting that the country 
had seen in decades.109  
The vast literature documenting the exacerbating effects of unchecked 
defamatory content on existing tension spans from the Holocaust110 to the 
Rwandan genocide111 and the current ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims 
in Myanmar.112  The United States is not immune, and if there is any lesson 
to be learned from the fake-news-inspired protest in Twin Falls, Idaho, it is 
that the corrosive effects of misinformation act quickly and unpredictably.113  
Returning to the Alvarez dichotomy, then, the marketplace of ideas 
justification for protecting fake news appears relatively weak, since its 
potential harm seems to outweigh its value.114  Despite being a part of the 
indispensable “fourth pillar” of American democracy, fake news does little to 
uphold democratic functions typically underlying a more unbending theory 
of press freedom.  In fact, its perpetuation via social media undermines its 
ability to inform productive discourse in general, much less discourse of 
democratic importance.  Furthermore, given the psychological and 
economic factors at play with fake news online, the marketplace is less able 
to correct for this imbalance.  The logical conclusion might be that a passive 
approach depending on that illusory corrective power would be ineffectual 
and may leave affected groups vulnerable.  Then again, a shift from reliance 
on the marketplace of ideas to government intervention is equally 
 
 108 Ruud Koopmans & Susan Olzak, Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right‐Wing Violence in 
Germany, 110 AM. J. SOC. 198, 223–24 (2004).  
 109 Dettmer, supra note 9.  
 110 See Laraine R. Fergenson, Group Defamation: From Language to Thought to Action, in GROUP 
DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 71, 74–75 (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric M. Freedman 
eds., 1995) (discussing Nazi propaganda during World War II).  
 111 David Yanagizawa-Drott, Propaganda vs. Education: A Case Study of Hate Radio in Rwanda, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROPAGANDA STUDIES 378, 378-81, 389 (Jonathan Auerbach & Russ 
Castronovo eds., 2013).  
 112 Nick Baker, How Social Media Became Myanmar’s Hate Speech Megaphone, MYANMAR TIMES (Aug. 5, 
2016), https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/21787-how-social-media-became-myanmar-s-
hate-speech-megaphone.html; Associated Press, Authorities Find Rape Case Causing Mandalay Unrest 
Was Faked, IRRAWADDY (Jul. 21, 2014), https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/authorities-
find-rape-case-causing-mandalay-unrest-faked.html.  
 113 See generally Dickerson, supra note 14 (describing how quickly a fake news story and misinformation 
about a small Idaho town spread across the United States). 
 114 This model of analysis is, again, based on the simple categorical approach put forth in Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire for determining when First Amendment protection should uniformly retreat from a 
particular area of speech.  315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  
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undesirable, as Part III will address.  The more apt question in the interim 
may be one of time and scale, and whether the failure of the marketplace of 
ideas necessarily means that a resort to the law is warranted in spite of human 
adaptability.  
C.  Historical Precedents of a Hands-off Approach to New Technology 
As the American public moves further from the reality that informed its 
original conceptions of free expression, some suggest that the marketplace of 
ideas was never a useful metaphor for justifying the protection of factually 
false information in the first place.115  Zachary Price of U.C. Hastings Law 
School acknowledges that under the First Amendment, Americans have 
“enlightenment protections without enlightenment minds.”116  Given the 
human infallibility before the insidious influences of the internet, he says it is 
unproductive to imagine that the marketplace theory could ever work in 
reality.117  However, in his 2018 article, “Our Imperiled Absolutist First 
Amendment,” Price defends an interpretation that would still refuse 
government intervention on the issue of fake news.118 
If suspicion of government led to the rise of the current, inflexible 
formulation for protecting free expression, and the government is composed 
of individuals equally susceptible to the manipulations of fake news, Price 
contends that it is only “more imperative to keep the channels of 
communication open to competing viewpoints.”119  That said, any solution 
that avoids government interference is a more pragmatic extension of the 
marketplace of ideas theory: it nonetheless places the power to distinguish 
true from false in the hands of the information consumer.  As discussed 
above, however, the entrepreneurs of online deception might again prove the 
creaky First Amendment foundation too weak to withstand to such a 
dangerous development in the fight against unwarranted group-based 
prejudice. 
The absence of government intervention into open discourse is frequently 
justified by the idea that, when forced to confront certain low-value speech, 
the populace eventually develops immunities to the harms it incurs.120  Some 
legal scholars go so far as to view this immunity not only as a mere byproduct 
 
 115 Zachary Price, Our Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 817, 835–36 (2018). 
 116 Id. at 831. 
 117  Id. at 834–35. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. at 835. 
 120 Id. at 836. 
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of tolerance, but as having an important social value of its own.121  However, 
given that the “absolutist” conception of the First Amendment is largely a 
still growing development of the last hundred years or less,122 the limits of our 
collective immune system have only been tested a few times.  Price suggests 
that in the face of fake news, “the public will gradually inoculate itself against 
online manipulation, much as it eventually did with respect to earlier forms 
of propaganda.”123  This warrants another examination into how closely the 
analog past mirrors our digital present and whether the passive approach’s 
success in the past means that it will work in the future.  While the particular 
problems posed by social media-driven fake news are novel, the best 
comparison might be drawn between the internet age and the advent of the 
radio—hailed less than a century ago as a dangerous new medium for large 
scale misinformation arising in a similarly charged time. 
In the years between the world wars, when radio first began proliferating 
as a means of delivering media to the public, fears of mass violence in 
response to inciting fascist propaganda sound eerily familiar today.  “The 
greatest organizers of mass hysterias and the mass delusions today are states 
using the radio to excite terrors, incite hatreds, inflame masses,” one well-
known radio personality commented about the rapidly spreading 
technology.124  Aside from its scale, radio as a medium was unique in its 
ability to stir passions, particularly the emotive quality of the human voice.  
“Charismatic leaders, such as Adolf Hitler and Josef Goebbels, the Third 
Reich’s Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, used high-
pitched vocal frenzies to produce mass hysteria and emotion in their listeners 
. . . in ways that print could not,” noted Tiffany McKinney in a policy 
exploration of Radio Propaganda Disarmament.125  American talk radio 
 
 121 Lee C. Bollinger, Rethinking Group Libel, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND VIOLENCE  243, 248-49 (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric 
M. Freedman eds., 1995). 
 122 See Price, supra note 115, at 820 (suggesting that the First Amendment was largely dormant through 
the 1930s and 1940s and adopted a more absolutist line in response to Jim Crow laws).  Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s article, aptly titled, The First Amendment is an Absolute, is also widely cited as providing 
an influential overview of First Amendment Absolutism, though he suggests that the Schenck v. United 
States decision, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) was the true genesis of the debate about absolutism today. 
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.  245.  
 123 Price, supra note 115, at 836. 
 124 Adrian Chen, The Fake-News Fallacy, NEW YORKER (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/04/the-fake-news-fallacy (quoting Dorothy 
Thomas).  
 125 Tiffany McKinney, Radio Jamming: The Disarmament of Radio Propaganda, 13 SMALL WARS & 
INSURGENCIES 111, 112–13 (2002) (“Moreover, unlike print, the special characteristics of radio 
allow the menace of radio hate propaganda to be multiplied many times over.  Broadcasts, for 
instance, can be copied for multiple hearings and easily leave the confines of the station’s local 
listening area, reaching citizens in distant areas of the country and even in other parts of the world.  
A radio wave takes only 1/7th of a second to encircle the entire globe.”).  
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personality Father Charles Coughlin successfully wielded similarly 
manipulative techniques, including scapegoating, name-calling, and appeals 
to prejudice and bigotry to target minorities amidst populist appeals in the 
1930s.126  In this way, clickbait science is not the first mass campaign of 
emotionally evocative misinformation to reach American shores.  
The international community responded to this new media by cracking 
down on radio broadcasts referred to then as “fake news.”  These fears 
inspired resolutions from the League of Nations in 1927 opposing all news 
that was “obviously inaccurate, highly exaggerated, or deliberately 
distorted.”127  The United States clung to its comparatively strong protections 
of free press and resisted these “fake news” resolutions, insisting that false 
news on the radio required more press freedom, not less.128  However, that 
is not to say that the United States lacked any government-administered 
domestic protection from dangerous misinformation.129  
Although group libel had yet to be affirmed as a response to defamation 
of targeted minorities, a hands-on regulatory scheme referred to as the 
“Public Interest Theory” dominated American broadcast media law during 
this time.  The theory was a response to public worries that, given radio’s 
power over public opinion, a laissez-faire approach to the First Amendment 
relying on the marketplace of ideas would fail.130  
Central to effectuating the Public Interest Theory, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted the fairness doctrine in 
1949.131  The rule imposed an affirmative obligation on radio and television 
broadcasters to cover important and controversial issues of public interest, 
providing equal access to competing viewpoints on those issues.132  
Additionally, attacks made “upon the honesty, character, integrity or like 
personal qualities of an identified person or group” mandated structured 
opportunities for the attacked to respond.133  It was understood that the radio 
required these regulations: not only were the means of content production 
and dissemination too limited to an elite, non-representative few, but the 
 
 126 Jack Kay et al., From Coughlin to Contemporary Talk Radio: Fallacies & Propaganda in American Populist 
Radio, 5 J. RADIO STUD. 9, 11–13 (1998). 
 127 WILLIAM PRESTON JR. ET AL., HOPE AND FOLLY: THE UNITED STATES AND UNESCO, 1945–
1985, at 27 (1989).  
 128 Id. at 27–28. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343, 1345–46 (1970). 
 131 Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”? Evidence from the 
Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 279 (1997).   
 132 Id. at 279–80. 
 133 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1969). 
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radio was “the most influential medium for communicating ideas and 
shaping consciousness that has ever existed.”134  
Historian A. Brad Schwartz offers a defense of the fairness doctrine in his 
book on the predecessors of fake news, noting that “When news is forced to 
compete for ratings, journalism all too easily gives way to 
sensationalism…[and] [t]his can lead to a dangerous form of fake news with 
long-lasting repercussions.”135  Schwartz’s note on the tendencies of a 
“capitalist” media poignantly foreshadows the phenomena that have allowed 
fake news online to be so profitable, and so dangerous absent regulation.  
Today, the rest of the international community has (at least ostensibly) 
fallen more in line with the American view on truth in journalism, embracing 
the right of the media to be free from criminal sanctions for publishing false 
information.136  Domestically, the fairness doctrine escaped First 
Amendment attack in 1969, when Red Lion Broadcasting Company 
challenged the FCC’s ability to force them to allow a defamed author to 
respond to criticism made on its airwaves.137  Instead of viewing the fairness 
doctrine as a hindrance to the marketplace of ideas, the Supreme Court saw 
government intervention into broadcasting as facilitating it, by promoting 
discourse in the public interest.138  It remained the law of the land for 
decades, only coming to an end after an FCC vote in 1987.  By that time, 
there was enough competition in the broadcasting industry that enforcing 
diversity of viewpoints no longer seemed necessary.139  
There are many parallels between the early years of both the radio and 
the internet.  However, the comparison is far from perfect, and a view that 
our collective adaptability to propagandistic radio broadcasting indicates 
resilience in the face of online misinformation may be overly-optimistic.  
 
 134 Note, supra note 130, at 1351. 
 135 A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, BROADCAST HYSTERIA: ORSON WELLES’ WAR OF THE WORLDS AND THE 
ART OF FAKE NEWS 227 (2015). 
 136 During a Universal Periodic Review of Cameroon, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
stated that “the prosecution and punishment of journalists for the crime of publication of false news 
merely on the ground, without more, that the news was false, [is] in clear violation of Article 19 of 
the [ICCPR].”  U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations, ¶24, CCPR/C/79/Add.116 (Nov. 
1999).  For more information about the international legal attitude towards fake news, see U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and 
Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), particularly recommendations 33 and 34, 47 and 
49, relating to necessity and proportionality of restrictions on free speech, decriminalization of 
defamation and memory laws. 
 137 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389–90. 
 138 Id.  
 139 Robert D. Hershey Jr., F.C.C. Votes Down Fairness Doctrine in a 4-0 Decision, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 5, 1987), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/05/arts/fcc-votes-down-fairness-doctrine-in-a-4-0-
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To start, one of the primary drivers of the fairness doctrine as a response 
to radio and not newspapers was the fact that control of the airwaves was 
extremely restricted, and therefore more susceptible to the biases of a few 
broadcasting companies.140  This was not the case for newspapers, and is 
obviously not the case with the internet, where means of publication have 
never been more accessible.141  A more interesting comparison arises, 
however, between the top few broadcasting companies in the 1940’s and 
Silicon Valley’s major social media players, who largely control how we view 
and interact with news content today.142  While any particular biases woven 
into the confidential algorithms of Facebook and Twitter may be opaque, it 
is clear that advertising revenue is the major driver of high-level decisions 
about what populates our news feeds.143  Suggestions that major social media 
platforms should adopt a “public interest” agenda that would interfere with 
bottom lines may be naïve given the profit margins at issue.144  
It is unsurprising, then, that intermediaries have been the focus of 
conversations about how best to tackle fake news through regulation.145  As 
one extreme example, Germany’s 2017 NetzDG regulation made waves by 
imposing heavy fines on social media platforms that fail to promptly remove 
fake news from its platform.146  This type of legislation would be difficult to 
implement smoothly in the United States, given that Germany’s law relies on 
an existing set of private hate speech laws that have no American 
counterparts and would face daunting First Amendment barriers.147  
Constitutional concerns aside, it also would require an overhaul of the 
American laws governing intermediary liability, which currently exempt 
 
 140 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392. 
 141 See Volokh, supra note 51, at 1806–07. 
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seeking to reach its 1.6 billion users—noting that fake news accounted for more shares, reaction, 
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many internet service providers from responsibility for content posted on 
their platforms under Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act.148  
The first mandated annual report released in July 2018 by the entities 
regulated by NetzDG (primarily Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook) 
elaborating on their compliance indicated that takedown rates varied widely 
between tech giants.  For the most part, no fines had been levied, and in most 
cases the allegedly offending content has remained online.149  On the whole, 
however, it is poignant to recall that Facebook’s previous attempts to debunk 
false content failed to prevent that content from persisting in and corrupting 
the marketplace of ideas.  As such, it is yet unclear how effective NetzDG has 
been at attacking the overarching persistent effects of fake news on Facebook, 
even where content is removed.150   
At a more foundational level, it seems that some of social media’s most 
distorting features as a news platform are too deeply baked into its core to 
remedy with an algorithm tweak or new user interface.151  From the failure 
of sharing behavior to trigger analytical thought processes to the perverse 
economy of racist clickbait, social media was perhaps primed for an 
onslaught of fake news from its inception.152  
This is by no means a suggestion that these platforms be abandoned as a 
news source altogether, nor should the preceding discussion be viewed as an 
unqualified endorsement of the fairness doctrine or government imposition 
of intermediary-level liability as a solution to fake news.  However, public 
pressure on companies like Facebook to “fix” fake news by whatever means 
necessary have led to some interesting developments since the 2016 election.  
In late 2017, Facebook announced its intention to tweak its algorithms so 
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that more user-generated content and less news media and promotional 
content would feature in users’ news feeds.153  News media companies have 
noted this change with disdain, many having recently expended precious 
resources to conform to the new rules of social media.154  However, it may 
overall prove to be a beneficial change for the information consumer and the 
industry as a whole, creating a healthier distance between “social” and the 
“media.”155  
IV.  CRIMINAL GROUP LIBEL AND A JUSTIFIED SUSPICION OF 
GOVERNMENT 
After evaluating the many issues with a solution to fake news that relies 
on the marketplace of ideas, the alternative of active government 
intervention must be considered as well.  One of the most compelling avenues 
for such intervention would be through defamation law.  Justice Kennedy 
refers to defamation in Alvarez as a traditionally permissible form of 
government regulation targeting false speech that causes discrete harms.  
Criminal group libel laws, specifically, have a controversial past in the United 
States as a tool for combating speech that causes harm to minority groups.156  
The rise and fall of these laws in various social and political contexts is a 
telling indicator of how a government-administered solution would fare 
today as a legal antidote to religiously, racially, or ethnically charged fake 
news.  Ultimately, as flawed as a passive approach to fake news might be, the 
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historical unpopularity and questionable utility of group libel is evidence that 
it is an even less attractive option for today’s novel issues.  
Before engaging on matters of practical significance, however, the first 
hurdles to address are the theoretical justification and constitutionality of 
such a defamation-based solution.  Since James Madison’s early rebuke of 
the Alien and Sedition Acts in the 1800 Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 
criminal defamation laws have generally been subject to judicial suspicion, 
particularly as applied to the media.157  Yet, there are several reasons why 
some of the most widely cited justifications for extending protection to false 
statements might permit a resort to criminal libel law for non-political fake 
news that targets minority citizens.  More broadly, suggestions that fake news 
is entitled to the full force of constitutionally-mandated “freedom of the 
press” based on a marketplace of ideas theory are uncompelling, as discussed 
at length in Part II.  More narrowly, however, under a purely “self-
governance” theory of First Amendment protection, fake news that relates to 
private individuals is not a part of the cherished category of political 
discourse, as will be addressed in this section.  From these understandings, 
and the bare fact that the Supreme Court’s last word on group libel was to 
find it constitutional in 1952, this analysis will proceed to evaluate it as a 
legally plausible, though ultimately unwise alternative to the passive 
approach described in Part II.158  
Discussed here as a potentially ripe response to fake news, criminal group 
libel laws can be distinguished from other forms of speech regulation on four 
grounds.  These distinctions illuminate its particular appropriateness as a 
means to combat non-political fake news targeting individual members of 
minority groups.  First, and most obviously, fake news would be regulated as 
libel rather than slander.  Aside from the fact that it is written and not spoken, 
fake news as libel would not implicate “the immediate flare-up of insult and 
offense that ‘hate speech’ connotes,” in the words of Jeremy Waldron.159  
Rather, it is when expression that tends to call into question the humanity of 
others “becomes established as a visible or tangible feature of the 
environment” that the harm truly occurs, thus inviting recourse to the law.160  
The persistent effect of written speech is heightened with difficult-to-debunk 
content like fake news on social media, as noted in Part III.  
 
  157 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 575 (Jonathan Elliot 
ed., 1836); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931); cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  
  158 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). 
  159 WALDRON, supra note 5, at 45. 
  160 Id. at 45–47. 
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Second, in attempting to prevent mass violence against groups of 
individuals sparked by fake news, a solution that targets a public harm would 
be more appropriate, suggesting a resort to criminal, rather than civil law.  
The traditional civil tort foundations of defamation between private 
individuals extended largely to addressing harms to individual honorific, 
dignitary, and property rights.161  To the extent that this encompasses a 
broader aim than to simply resolve private disputes, it is limited to the (now 
purely metaphorical) old English interest in preventing “duels.”162  
Meanwhile, criminal laws relate more to the relationship between the 
individual, the public, and the state.163  In this way, the problem of fake news 
and defamed minority groups leans more towards government over private 
enforcement, in that it addresses harms felt both at individual and societal 
levels. 
Third, (and especially in the context of a libel against the press) a criminal 
libel law targeting only existing fake news articles should be distinguished 
from a prior restraint on speech.  Near v. Minnesota approached an instance of 
group defamation as a “public nuisance,” though the remedy was simply a 
prohibition on further publication.164  Near famously rebuked this as prior 
restraint on publication, under a “conception of the liberty of the press as 
historically conceived and guaranteed,” so long ago as the time of 
Blackstone.165  Libel, by contrast, stood on solid foundation for “punishment 
for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the protection 
of the public,” and as such, “common law rules that subject the libeler to 
responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private injury, are not 
abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions.”166  While today, 
libel is subject to First Amendment scrutiny, it theoretically receives less of a 
categorical rebuke for its post-hoc nature, which would tend to chill far less 
speech than other forms of pre-emptive government restraint.167  Applied to 
 
 161 Post, supra note 90, at 720. 
 162 Id. at 704–05 n.83. 
 163 Id.  
 164 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).  Though styled as a “public nuisance” case, 
interestingly enough, one of the charges at issue in Near was “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory 
articles,” concerning, among others, “the Jewish race.”  Justice Butler’s dissent found the racialized 
and abusive content at issue particularly disturbing, and worthy of sanction.  Id.  He noted that 
“existing libel laws are inadequate effectively to suppress evils resulting from the kind of business 
and publications that are shown in this case.” Id. at 737 (Butler, J., dissenting).  Butler lamented the 
failures of a system that invalidated the Minnesota statute, thus exposing the community “to the 
constant and protracted false and malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have 
purpose and sufficient capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or program for oppression, 
blackmail or extortion.”  Id. at 737–38. 
 165 Id. at 713 (majority opinion). 
 166 Id. at 715. 
 167 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).  
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fake news, any speech restriction imposed would need to act only against 
stories that are already swirling around social media, and not as a forward-
looking prohibition on creators, hosts, publishers, or sharers.  In short, libel 
is the best way to achieve this without running afoul of Near.   
Finally, the proposed criminal defamation law would target only non-
political fake news, which is where criminal “group” libel comes into play.  
In contrast to criminal libel more generally, criminal group libel is a 
vindication of a public right through a private right.  In other words, it seeks 
to protects individual members of groups, not individuals themselves.  
Criminal defamation, as a doctrine, has often been tied up in concerns about 
its specific tendency to undermine democracy.168  Well-founded worries 
about giving the censorial power to the government have directly inspired 
many of the most significant modern refinements to the First Amendment 
treatment of defamation: to protect critics of the government from 
interference or even prosecution by the government.169  However, a patently 
false tale about a fictional immigrant or racial minority has little to do with 
the hallowed Madisonian understanding that “[t]he value and efficacy of the 
[right of electing the members of the government] depends on the knowledge 
of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust.”170  
The concept of a group libel law (a distinctly non-political cousin of the 
outmoded seditious libel law) grew precisely out of this non-political 
exception to Madison’s suspicion of criminal defamation.  Instead of 
protecting the state itself, group libel combats defamation impacting group 
members’ acceptance into society, their occupational and educational 
opportunities, their citizenship, or even their humanity.171  
Constitutional legal scholar Robert Post has described the common law 
of defamation as an “intellectual wasteland, perplexed with minute and 
barren distinctions.”172  Although often fuzzy and overlapping, the four 
distinctions listed above are nonetheless useful to this exercise, which aims to 
rectify a specific but multidimensional type of harm as narrowly as possible.  
Regulating political fake news as opposed to non-political fake news, for 
example, would involve an entirely different calculus here, as would a law 
targeting fake news that targets a specific individual, rather than a larger 
minority group.  
 
 168 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
 169 Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200–01 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 71 (1964). 
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974), for a 
similar effort in a civil libel context. 
 170 Madison, supra note 157, at 575.  
 171 WALDRON, supra note 5, at 57.  
 172 Post, supra note 90, at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF 
TORTS 243 (13th ed. 1929)).  
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Among the potential solutions to the problem of racially, ethnically, or 
religiously charged fake news today, criminal group libel is a tempting one.  
Functionally, its deep historical roots in common tort law establish a 
relatively neat legal framework around which duty, causation, and harm 
might be framed.173  Although libel is no longer wholly thought to exist 
outside of constitutional scrutiny, group libel targeted narrowly in terms of 
race, religion, and ethnicity fails to clearly sound the alarm bell of unwieldy 
government censorial power over political criticism.  Despite popular 
resistance among legal scholars and free speech advocates, this would not be 
the first foray that the United States has taken into a government-
administered solution to ethnic, religious, or racial defamation.  This 
historical background is critical in addressing real174 and hypothetical 
arguments175 for the return of group libel today. 
A.  The Tempting Precedent of Group Libel in America 
The uniquely American pursuit of social justice through criminal 
defamation began in 1908 with a local film censorship law, drafted by a 
Jewish lawyer in Chicago named Adolf Kraus.176  The first of its kind, it has 
been suggested that his law was likely a reaction to the release of The 
Clansman, a racially charged and highly offensive novel, as well as 
“sensationalist” accounts of Jewish criminals published in McClure’s Magazine.  
“For Jews and African Americans, the pain of social exclusion, the shame of 
accusations of criminality, and the fear of violence motivated their efforts to 
reform racial representations in popular culture, converging, in particular, 
on the censorship of the new medium of motion pictures.”177  The law was 
unusual among other similar censorship legislation at the time for two 
reasons.  First, it specifically aimed to curtail racial offense through certain 
types of media, and second, the law was not limited to film.178  Kraus’s city-
wide law was eventually introduced to the Illinois state legislature in 1915 by 
Robert Raymond Jackson, a Black state representative from Chicago, and a 
 
 173 See generally Post, supra note 90, at 692 (acknowledging that reputation is a “mysterious thing,” but 
exploring how defamation law has, over hundreds of years, created a framework for addressing 
various forms of harm to it).  
 174 Philosopher Peter Singer has endorsed the idea that group libel should be revisited to combat fake 
news, given the aforementioned threat to democracy, and the appeal of a criminal legal solution. 
Peter Singer, Free Speech and Fake News, FINANCIAL ADVISOR (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.fa-
mag.com/news/free-speech-and-fake-news-30761.html?section. 
 175 WALDRON, supra note 5, at 64. 
 176 M. ALISON KIBLER, CENSORING RACIAL RIDICULE 116 (2015); Ellen C. Scott, Black “Censor,” 
White Liberties: Civil Rights and Illinois’s 1917 Film Law, 64 AM. Q. 219, 221 (2012).  
 177 KIBLER, supra note 176, at 116.  
 178 Scott, supra note 176, at 223. 
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version of it was passed in 1917.179  Censorship of this sort gelled with 
Jackson’s unique vision for racial equality, which prioritized protecting the 
image of African Americans from threatening stereotypes as a conduit to 
protection from physical harm.180  From a legal perspective, the law faced 
little scrutiny under the First Amendment: at that time, libel still generally 
fell outside of the scope of constitutional speech protection and the Supreme 
Court had categorically upheld film censorship in Ohio v. Mutual Films two 
years earlier.181  A more searching inquiry into the legality of these types of 
laws was simply yet to come.  
A broader, nationwide fascination with “group libel,” (as it is known 
today) began in 1942, and carried the conversation from the movie theater 
to the front lines of World War II and defense of democracy from fascism.182  
Attorney-turned-sociologist David Riesman lamented “the systematic 
avalanche of falsehoods which are circulated concerning the various groups, 
classes, and races which make up the countries of the western world” in a 
series of articles about charged propaganda.183  As a Jewish German-
American intellectual, Riesman’s analysis was framed around an ongoing 
genocide within which he undeniably found himself at the center, though his 
articles found broad appeal around the country.184 
Riesman saw group libel as largely misunderstood and underutilized in 
the United States.  He found this to be the result of the American tendency 
to view “reputation” as merely a capitalistic asset.185  Yet, to Riesman, 
“reputation” had an intrinsic value critical to the safety of minority groups 
and democracy as a whole.186  However, acknowledging an American 
emphasis on protecting values of self-governance, Riesman noted that any 
group libel law adopted “must be discriminating in judging what sorts of 
criticism—though mistaken in fact—further democratic cause and which 
sorts of defamatory falsehood hinder it.”187  Despite this Madisonian 
homage, Riesman ultimately found that the risks of abuse were outweighed 
by the risk of mass violence that opposed the use of group libel.188  
 
 179 Id. at 224. 
 180 Id. at 231, 235.  
 181 236 U.S. 230, 244–45 (1915).  
 182 Evan P. Schultz, Group Rights, American Jews, and the Failure of Group Libel Laws, 1913–1952, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 71, 124 (2000). 
 183 David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 727 (1942). 
 184 Id. at 727; SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 
79–80 (1994).  
 185 Riesman, supra note 183, at 731. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 755.  
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Ten years later, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed with 
Riesman, handily upholding a criminal libel statute in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 
again under the understanding that libel categorically fell entirely outside of 
First Amendment protection.189  The challenge before the Court concerned 
none other than Adolf Kraus and Robert Raymond Jackson’s 1917 Illinois 
film censorship law.  In that case, Joseph Beauharnais, the president of the 
White Circle League of America, was charged criminally for distributing a 
pamphlet which defamed the African-American race.  The leaflet advocated 
for the protection of the white race from “mongreliz[ation]” and “rapes, 
robberies, guns, knives, and marijuana of the negro,” in such a way that it 
unlawfully exposed African Americans to “contempt, derision, or obloquy” 
or was “productive of breach of the peace or riots.”190 
The Illinois statute, so hard-won in the state legislature by Assemblyman 
Jackson thirty-five years earlier, was scrutinized by a court that had witnessed 
tragedy uncontemplated when it was written in 1917.  The majority’s defense 
of the statute in Beauharnais noted that “Illinois did not have to . . . await the 
tragic experience of the last three decades to conclude that willful purveyors 
of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and tend 
powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered 
life in a metropolitan, polyglot community.”191  The immediacy of the racial 
tensions in Chicago at the time certainly played a role in Frankfurter’s 
opinion.  However, on a larger scale, it seemed as if the horrors of World 
Wars I and II were also fresh enough to fortify a state interest in regulating 
speech unworthy of First Amendment protection for its divisive power.  
Meanwhile, the dissenters hinted that the decision could be perverted in 
practice, with Justice Douglas commenting, “Today a white man stands 
convicted for protesting in unseemly language against our decisions 
invalidating restrictive covenants.  Tomorrow a Negro will be hailed before 
a court for denouncing lynch law.”192  However, the fact that the libel statute 
evaded true First Amendment analysis at the time meant that a rational basis 
was all that was required for it to pass constitutional muster.  Attempts to 
reframe Mr. Beauharnais’ pamphlet within abstract discursive values or the 
nature of democracy failed before the post-World War II reckoning with the 
destructive power of the disillusioned masses.193  Ultimately, Douglas’s 
practical concerns about group libel were defeated by the majority’s analysis 
 
 189 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 
266 (1952).  
 190 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251–52; WALDRON, supra note 5, at 48. 
 191 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258–59.  
 192 Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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of the dominant social risk at the time.  As David Riesman had conceived of 
it, “[i]n more or less democratic lands . . . the threat of fascism and the chief 
dangers to freedom of discussion do not spring from the ‘state,’ but from 
‘private’ fascist groups in the community.”194  With the affirmation of Joseph 
Beauharnais’ conviction, fears of government abuse were suspended before 
the greater threat posed by societal bigotry writ large, just long enough for 
the affirmative restriction on speech to hold up.195  
B.  Practical Concerns and Subsequent Legal Developments 
Today, the legal status of group libel laws is a topic of much debate.196  
Their lurking presence in some state criminal codes is especially important 
to note in evaluating its appropriateness in a new context: fake news that 
defames minority groups.197  While its technical legal foundations have been 
eroded, Beauharnais has never been explicitly overruled.198  In fact, it is still 
cited, albeit furtively, for the proposition that libel carries with it a diminished 
First Amendment value.199  In 1964, The Supreme Court held in New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that private libel was no longer fully 
immune from First Amendment scrutiny, which is the most frequently cited 
roadblock to any proposed resuscitation of Beauharnais.200  Subsequent 
extension of the Sullivan “actual malice” requirement to cases involving even 
private figures has restricted its applicability beyond vindication of 
democratic purposes and into a more encompassing protection of the press 
 
 194 Riesman, supra note 183, at 779.  Reisman continued: “In this state of affairs, it is no longer tenable 
to continue a negative policy of protection from the state; such a policy, in concrete situations, plays 
directly into the hands of the groups whom supporters of democracy need most to fear.”  Id. at 779–
80. 
 195 Id. at 778–79.   
 196 WALDRON, supra note 5, at 52.  See generally WALKER, supra note 184, at 77–78 (contextualizing the 
historical legal status of group libel laws); Kristen Grauer, From Beauharnais to Sullivan, 4 
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 197 See COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, CRITICS ARE NOT CRIMINALS (2016), 
https://cpj.org/x/6761 (discussing the status of state level criminal defamation laws in the United 
States, noting that at least one state—Massachusetts—retains a group libel statute, though many 
more still have broader criminal defamation laws). 
 198 WALDRON, supra note 5, at 61–62. 
 199 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 747 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing types of 
false information that are not within the First Amendment’s protection, noting that the ‘‘prevention 
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Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952)). 
 200 WALDRON, supra note 5, at 28 (citing ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE 
HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 158–59 (2007)).  Waldron contests both this 
proposition, which he refers to as a “consensus,” and the broader idea that Sullivan “removed . . . 
the whole category of libel from the list of exception to the protection of free speech” altogether.  
Id. at 52.  
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generally.201  Furthermore, in 1992, the categorical approach endorsed in 
Chaplinsky was further complicated by the imposition of a “viewpoint neutral” 
requirement in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.202  However, despite these legal 
developments, social context can inform First Amendment jurisprudence in 
significant ways, as the rise of group libel in the United States over a 
tumultuous span of almost forty years demonstrates.203  
While the Court’s more lax approach to government speech regulation 
allowed group libel to be upheld in Beauharnais,204 it is important to remember 
that an urgent social need at the time seemed to require this result.205  Lee 
Bollinger noted several years after R.A.V. that while he did not then believe 
that a criminal group libel law would necessarily stand up in the Supreme 
Court, “a change in social conditions and a corresponding change of heart 
about group libel would not find the First Amendment jurisprudence 
 
 201 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454–55 
(2011) (finding a protest of the Westboro Baptist Church to be speech “fairly characterized as 
constituting speech on a matter of public concern” (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 
(1983))); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (White, J., concurring) (holding 
a televangelist to be a “public figure” who could not recover tort damages from a caricature); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–46 (1974) (holding that private individuals “are therefore 
more vulnerable to injury [from defamatory statements], and the state interest in protecting them 
is correspondingly greater”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964) (extending the “actual 
malice” test to statements attacking “the personal integrity” of Louisiana judges). 
 202 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
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dicta, addressed this problem briefly in its majority opinion, noting that while “libel” might still be 
proscribable, a regulation that only targeted certain forms of libel might not stand up.  R.A.V., 505 
U.S. at 387; see also Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography after R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 873, 876 (1993) (“Exceptions to the viewpoint neutral rule exist, although the Court rarely 
has seen fit to acknowledge them as such; in a number of areas of First Amendment law, and 
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and less obvious forms of viewpoint preference.” (internal brackets omitted)).  Kagan mentions that 
commercial speech, as an example, is an area especially prone to such exceptions, which perhaps 
only strengthens earlier arguments that particular forms of commercially-driven fake news might 
face an interesting evaluation under current First Amendment precedent.  Id. at 876 n.13. 
 203 As for eluding the R.A.V. evolution, Kagan has suggested, for example, that placing the narrower 
category of group libel, which has a “built in” viewpoint discrimination as a category again outside 
of scrutiny.  Id. at 899.  
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scrutiny); Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 247 (1915) (holding that film 
is not entitled to First Amendment protection). 
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unreceptive.”206  He posited that “a significant rise in violence toward certain 
minority groups, especially if it were the product of a highly organized and 
conspiratorial extremist group, could yield a different result, even under 
existing Supreme Court precedents.”207  Given the ease with which 
campaigns of fake news are created and disseminated, it is possible that even 
a campaign falling short of a “highly organized effort” might be able to 
generate widespread animosity towards a minority group (particularly one 
posing an identity threat to the majority).  The widespread defamation of a 
small refugee population in Twin Falls, Idaho is an excellent example of how 
little overarching strategy would be required to realize such an effort, beyond 
a mastery of clickbait science and a receptive social media audience.208 
In light of this uncertainty, the drawbacks of group libel must be 
addressed.  The lessons of American experimentation with group libel in the 
twentieth century do not stop at an observation of its oscillating popularity 
amidst varying degrees of social strife.  This history also suggests that, in 
addition to the unraveling of its theoretical legal foundations, group libel’s 
overall decline over time was also a result of its impracticality as an 
enforcement mechanism for the rights of minority groups.  From the 
inaptitude of litigation to effectively quash dangerous falsehoods to problems 
associated with a government-wielded censorial power, criminal group libel 
would be an unattractive solution to combat fake news, even if constitutional.  
To start, there are several purely functional concerns with libel law as an 
alternative “truth seeking” mechanism to the marketplace of ideas.  The 
English foundations of libel law provided no defense for truth, under the 
premise that “the greater the truth, the greater the libel.”209  Today, however, 
the defense is viewed as a necessary protection of free speech and legitimate 
publication in a modern society.210  While sensible in theory, the defense of 
truth poses many problems to preventing the spread of stereotypes and 
falsities amongst susceptible information consumers through libel law.  
First and most obvious of those issues is the difficulty of tracing layered 
fake news trails like the alleged “Islamic Takeover” of Twin Falls, Idaho, 
coverage of which was riddled with falsehoods rooted in an iota of truth.211  
In a sense, the most damaging fake news campaigns are destined to be the 
most difficult to detangle under modern libel law. Notably, Justice 
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Frankfurter largely avoided the conversation about the truth of the 
defamatory statements in Beauharnais.  Rather, he deferred to the trial court, 
which rejected the defendant’s offer to prove the truth of the matters.212  By 
couching this evasion within the Chaplinsky conception that abusive words 
have such “slight social value as a step to truth,” Frankfurter hinted that truth 
was, in a sense, irrelevant to the inquiry, given the injury or incitement that 
such abuse causes.213  Subsequent legal precedents modifying Chaplinsky 
aside,214 a discussion of truth would be harder to avoid in a suit pertaining 
less to opinion than disputed fact, for example, in a libel suit about a 
contested news article or advertisement.215  
Assuming that some discussion of truth would inevitably follow, the next 
hurdle would be harm incurred in that very search.  Early critiques of the 
newly anointed group libel doctrine around the time of Beauharnais invoked 
the “sounding board” technique used by Nazis in Germany.216  Libel suits 
were not only an opportunity to martyrize Nazis, but also provided an 
elevated platform for their propaganda, despite that the litigation was 
instigated precisely to challenge it.217  Stateside, attempts in the 1930s to 
bring similar libel suits against Henry Ford for his anti-Semitic publication, 
The Dearborn Independent, were criticized by pragmatists for similar reasons.218  
Later, the American Jewish Committee (“AJC”) defended its eventual 
categorical rebuke of group libel as a civil rights tool, worrying that a defense 
of truth might “turn the courtroom into a forum for discussion of such issues 
as whether or not Jews are evil.”219  
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ADVISORY COUNCIL LEGIS. INFO. BULL., at 1, 7 (June 10, 1949) (on file with the American Jewish 
Congress archives).  Interestingly, attempts to have Congress investigate Nazi and fascist groups in 
America led to the creation of the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities (“HUAC”) 
in 1938, which soon switched its main focus to Communists.  See WALKER, supra note 184, at 60.  
The HUAC eventually took on arguably anti-Semitic overtones in its hunts for Reds.  Id. 
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The modern (and notably more light-hearted) equivalent of this problem 
is colloquially referred to as the “Streisand Effect,” named for Barbra 
Streisand’s futile attempts to prevent publication of photos of her home in 
2003.220  This phenomenon has already shown to have complicated the fake-
news epidemic before any libel suits have even reached the courts.  In 
December 2017, Facebook announced that it would no longer flag stories it 
hosts as “disputed,” since research had shown that this moniker had only 
served to increase the likelihood that users would click on the article 
flagged.221  In the end, the “search for truth” in highly inflammatory content 
is a seemingly impossible one, given the realities of human psychology and 
the new rules of the news media landscape.  Regulating fake news promoting 
intergroup conflict through libel might be legally justifiable in the proper 
social context.  However, even within this conception, libel again falls short 
on grounds of functional utility.  
The problems with group libel extend beyond the courts’ inability to 
uncover the truth.  As with any law that gives the government a censorial 
power over speech, there is no guarantee that it will only be used in its 
intended context.  Government mistrust is central to a critique of libel law as 
a tool for protecting minority groups on several levels.  Most fundamentally, 
it demonstrates its limitations as a doctrine rooted in First Amendment rather 
than Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection ideals.222  Though group libel 
was developed to protect vulnerable groups, its protections and powers are 
not restricted in their use solely to the groups that may have developed or 
advocated for them.  Modern libel law requires a defense of truth, though, 
especially in group conflict, “true” is not and cannot be a substitute for any 
individual’s definition of “right,” “moral,” or even “useful” in a campaign 
for social justice.  More specifically, however, as it pertains to the press’s vital 
role in modern society, even legal developments like the “actual malice” 
requirement cannot fully prevent abuse and chilling effects.  The inability of 
libel law to successfully account for its inherent malleability is exacerbated by 
a broader mistrust of government and the people who comprise it.  For those 
 
 220 Mario Cacciottolo, The Streisand Effect: When Censorship Backfires, BBC NEWS (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18458567. 
 221 Jeff Smith, Grace Jackson & Seetha Raj, Designing Against Misinformation, MEDIUM (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://medium.com/facebook-design/designing-against-misinformation-e5846b3aa1e2. 
 222 For a complementary discussion about the origins of the 1917 Illinois group libel law and a 
conception of censorship as an equalizing mechanism in a deeply racist society, see, e.g., Scott, supra 
note 176, at 241 (“In an era in which there was de facto censorship of black subjectivity, Jackson 
engaged in de jure censorship to promote black public recognition, a strategy of negotiation and 
appeasement of dominant paradigms, though not dominant Progressive Era ideologies concerning 
race or censorship. Jackson’s law is less a censorship law than an attempt to commandeer the 
existing censorial impulse to a racially liberatory purpose.”). 
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tackling fake news today, these concerns may ultimately be no different from 
those faced by civil rights activists almost one hundred years earlier.  
Again, history speaks for itself: the 1917 Illinois film censorship-turned-
group-libel statute in Beauharnais was a criminal law to be enforced by the 
state for the purpose of protecting vulnerable groups rather than further 
victimizing them.  From a practical perspective, the law was questionably 
successful in this aim from the start, in large part because enforcement was 
the duty of a largely white police force.223  The creation of adjunct citizen 
film-censorship boards was an attempt to mitigate this problem, but political 
forces yielded uneven access to those boards between certain minority 
groups, and even resulted in hostility between them.224  Jackson’s state 
censorship law failed to uniformly prevent the showing of The Birth of A Nation, 
the film adaptation of the novel The Clansman, which had inspired the law’s 
initial drafter.225  
Even David Riesman, the original instigator of the American group libel 
conception, eventually had his doubts once he saw the doctrine in use.  
Sometime after writing his original articles (but a year before Beauharnais) 
Riesman came full circle on his risk analysis pertaining to government 
regulation of this particular form of social justice advocacy.226  Riesman 
never directly explained what led him to abandon his prior advocacy of 
criminal libel, but instances of confrontational, “militant” actions by Jewish 
advocacy groups to enforce censorship of anti-Semitic speakers (and even use 
of derogatory stereotypes in theatrical productions) was hypothesized to have 
played a role.227  By that point, several other prominent Jewish groups had 
abandoned support of the doctrine, including the AJC, as early as 1935.228  
One of the earlier proponents of these laws, the AJC had decided that other 
 
 223 Id. at 237–38. 
 224 KIBLER, supra note 176, at 167, 170 (“Jews, particularly Jewish women, gained more power in 
censorship than other racial groups.  Uneven access, as well as ongoing doubts about the wisdom 
of protecting of any racial minority through censorship, led to complaints about the unfair politics 
of Chicago censorship.”).  
 225 KIBLER, supra note 176, at 164; Scott, supra note 176, at 237.   
 226 See generally WALKER, supra note 184, at 99–100.  
 227 Id. at 99–100, 106.  For more information about Riesman’s post-war views on complex Jewish 
identity politics, see generally Susan A. Glenn, The Jewish Cold War: Anxiety and Identity in the Aftermath 
of the Holocaust, in 24 DAVID W. BELIN LECTURE IN AM. JEWISH AFF. (Jean & Samuel Frankel 
Center for Judaic Studies, 2014).   
 228 Schultz, supra note 182, at 129 (“While the AJC decided to oppose group libel laws as early as 1935, 
other Jewish organizations took longer to develop a set policy about the topic . . . . [F]our major 
Jewish defense organizations expressed their views about group libel in response to a bill offered in 
Congress that would ban defamatory material from the mails and from interstate commerce.”). 
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methods of enforcing civil rights for the Jewish population, like education, 
would be more effective than a resort to criminal libel laws.229  
Counterproductive enforcement only continued after the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of criminal group libel.  Unsurprisingly, 
Douglas’s dissent in Beauharnais indeed proved prophetic, and in the wake of 
Brown v. Board of Education, segregationists looking for new ways to fight the 
ever-expanding civil rights movement found a friend in libel law.230  A 
campaign of targeted defamation suits aimed largely at northern, liberal 
media coverage of racial issues and statements by organizations like the 
NAACP aimed to divert precious resources from entities fighting the 
oppression of African Americans.231  
A range of anti-segregationist leaders had brought suit: from Mississippi 
Sheriff Lawrence Rainey, over coverage of the murders of three civil rights 
activists, to James Earl Ray, the confessed assassin of Martin Luther King, 
Jr.232  Interestingly, however, these lawsuits were individual civil libel claims, 
and yet the sentiment behind them encompassed much more than private 
feuds.  The northern anti-segregationist publications at issue were viewed by 
Southerners as having attacked them as a people, and as a result, these 
falsehoods were causing dangerous divisions in American society.233  New York 
Times v. Sullivan was one such defamation case, and in limiting the reach of 
libel law in the United States, its unexpected ruling helped to end what many 
 
 229 Id. at 112.  Among the other factors contributing to the abandonment of group libel amongst its 
earlier proponents in the Jewish community was a feeling of anxiousness about the idea of outwardly 
identifying as a distinct religious and ethnic group, when assimilation seemed to be the safest way 
to avoid conflict in America at the time.  Id. at 116.  
 230 Aimee Edmondson, In Sullivan’s Shadow: The Use and Abuse of Libel Law Arising from the Civil Rights 
Movement, 1960–89, 37 JOURNALISM HIST. 27, 35 (2011); Christopher W. Schmidt, New York 
Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on the Civil Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV. 293, 294-96.  
 231 Group libel was notably not the precise weapon of choice in these lawsuits, though likely only 
because it did not need to be.  Prior to 1964, the government did not need to disguise its attacks 
within the more narrow framework of group-based defamation claims: maligned police 
commissioners, mayors and public officers could easily bring suit in their individual capacities 
without having to invoke the more complex dynamics involved in a Beauharnais-type lawsuit.  
Schmidt, supra note 230, at 307–08.  
 232 Edmondson, supra note 230, at 32–33. 
 233 Schmidt, supra note 230, at 305–06, 310.  Although these cases are not a direct indictment of group 
libel, they nonetheless illustrate the danger libel poses in a highly polarized society.  A common 
note of frustration to the plaintiffs in several of those defamation suits were allegations of police 
brutality, particularly when responding to civil rights demonstrations, a theme that continues to 
divide Americans even today.  See Rob Kahn, Three First Amendment Puzzles Raised by the Police Union 
Response to Speech Criticizing Police Conduct in Ferguson and New York City, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 
163, 194 (2017) (“[I]t is worth noting that the tolerant society envisioned by Bollinger has not come 
to pass in this particular context.  Given how Ferguson and other, more recent police shootings 
shine a light on implicit bias, it is worth exploring whether such bias also extends to the speech we 
as a society feel is worth protecting.”).  
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saw as a wave of libel litigation threatening to exhaust the civil rights 
movement.234 
C.  Limitations of Modern Libel 
Sullivan is significant to this analysis both because it factually illustrates 
the misuse of libel laws during the civil rights movement, but also sketches 
out the limitations of how the modern era has approached preventing such 
abuse.  While post-Sullivan developments in libel law do not clearly foreclose 
the constitutionality of a group libel solution to fake news, they also do not 
clearly address some of its major drawbacks.  First, it is unclear whether 
protections like the “actual malice” standard would apply to a group libel suit.  
This is relevant to any liability imposed on the press, in particular, given that 
a law failing to require some measure of intent would criminalize too-wide 
of a range of news content beyond intentionally misleading fake news.  
Second, even in spite of the “actual malice” standard, government abuse 
might still occur through calculated libel enforcement against (instead of on 
behalf of) vulnerable ethnic, racial, and religious groups.235  Third, beyond 
the damaging potential of enforcement itself, the resulting chilling effect on 
lawful news coverage would have potentially devastating impact, as would 
be the case with any criminal imposition on free speech.  
It is uncontested that Sullivan was a step in the right direction towards 
addressing these issues, and its impact on libel liability, particularly for press 
coverage of public officials, should not be understated.  Factually, Sullivan 
eerily mirrors what Justice Douglas foresaw in his Beauharnais dissent: an 
advertisement taken out by anti-segregationist groups, attempting to gain 
sympathy before northern liberals by weaving a poorly fact-checked 
complaint about treatment of protesters in Alabama.  In a landmark decision, 
the Supreme Court stipulated a more stringent mens rea for civil libel: 
“actual malice,” rather than the typical presumption of malice through mere 
publication.  Two years later, Garrison v. Louisiana would apply the Sullivan 
civil libel “actual malice” standard to criminal libel.236 
Sullivan and Garrison were in many ways tied to Madisonian ideals of 
democratic justice, homages to the press’s unique role as “one of the great 
interpreters between the government and the people.”237  In his Sullivan 
 
 234 Schmidt, supra note 230, at 325.  
 235 See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 233, at 194–95 (assessing the racialized current First Amendment 
landscape surrounding issues of police brutality and implicit bias, and the flexible nature of “factual 
dispute” in these discussions).  
 236 379 U.S. 64, 67, 69 (1964).  Garrison would also impose further requirements as to a defense of truth 
and statutory specificity on criminal libel laws.  Id. at 70–73. 
 237 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).  
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opinion, Justice Brennan wasted no time in comparing a libel suit filed by a 
Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama directly to the Sedition Act of 
1798, stating that “[t]he right of free public discussion of the stewardship of 
public officials was . . . a fundamental principle of the American form of 
government.”238  However, this was not a discussion of broad mistrust in 
government; it was simply a rejection of government’s ability to quash 
democratic discourse.  In fact, both opinions presented an opportunity to 
expand the “actual malice” standard to more private libels, (à la Beauharnais), 
but only raised the criminal libel statute to distinguish it from one that 
permits cases to be brought by “public men” rather than a maligned social 
group.239  
The doctrine was expanded beyond the purely political in subsequent 
cases, though the mens rea requirement for a group libel suit remedying 
private reputational harm from false factual “press” coverage remains 
opaque despite these holdings.  As it pertains to libel, two bookend cases set 
out a range within which such a law might fit: Gertz v. Robert Welch expanded 
the press-protective scienter requirement of Sullivan to libel of public figures, 
while the Court refused to apply actual malice where matters were in the 
private interest of the two parties in Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss.240  On one 
hand, the fact that an audience is willing to click on a fake news article might 
indicate that it is of broader interest than the holding in Greenmoss, which dealt 
with private credit reports.  On the other hand, the Gertz holding relied on a 
conception that public figures willfully thrust themselves into the spotlight.  
Because they are public figures having access to means of publicity, these 
potential plaintiffs would be less reliant on libel law to correct any 
defamation.241  This logic would not apply to private citizens defamed by a 
fake news article.  Even in the age of the internet, which arguably provides 
anyone a platform from which to issue “corrections,” this may still not satisfy 
Gertz, given the aforementioned difficulty in debunking particular forms of 
fake news. 
 
 
 
 238 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274–75 (1964). 
 239 Id. at 268; Garrison, 379 U.S. at 70–71.  Group libel was admittedly not clearly disrupted by Garrison, 
with the majority noting that “only narrowly drawn statutes designed to reach words tending to 
cause a breach of the peace. . . or designed to reach speech, such as group vilification, ‘especially 
likely to lead to public disorders,’ such as the statute sustained in Beauharnais.”  Garrison, 379 U.S. at 
70.  
 240 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1984).  
 241 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44.  
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Furthermore, an expansion of the “public figure” doctrine in parallel 
cases involving the application of the “actual malice” standard in intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) cases raise further questions.242  
Hustler v. Falwell (1988) extended the actual malice standard to suits for IIED 
for false factual statements made about a public figure, well-known Baptist 
minister Jerry Falwell.243  However, in 2011, the Supreme Court took a 
different approach to its scienter analysis in Snyder v. Phelps, applying the 
actual malice standard based less on the identity of the defamed, but more 
on the public relevance of the defamatory content.244  Despite that the 
plaintiff in Snyder was a private citizen, the court found that Westboro Baptist 
Church protesters at his son’s funeral were entitled to “actual malice” 
protection because their offensive signs related to matters of public interest.245  
The relevance of this latest development is unclear at it pertains to fake news, 
which might be distinguished on the basis that it falsely portrays itself as fact, 
while Snyder treated politically charged opinion.  Fake news presents an 
interesting challenge to several aspects of this series of post-Sullivan decisions, 
though the gaps ultimately leave the question as to a group libel suit for 
enforcement against creators of fake news open.  
All of this aside, the “actual malice” standard, conceived in Sullivan partly 
as a protective device for suits against publishers, may not be insurmountable 
in today’s online news landscape, even if applied.  The advertisement at issue 
in Sullivan was approved and printed by the New York Times based on the fact 
that it was “endorsed by a number of people . . . whose reputation [the Times’ 
secretary] had no reason to question.”246  Although no attempt was made to 
check the accuracy of its assertions,247 this was famously not enough to trigger 
the new “actual malice” standard, since the plaintiffs failed to show 
knowledge that the statements were false.248  This is a far cry from the state 
of mind of the creators and curators of some of the most notoriously viral 
fake news stories, many of whom have been open about their falseness and 
complete dearth of journalistic rigor.249  Yet, despite these differences, intent 
 
 242 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967); 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343–44.  
 243 485 U.S. 46, 46, 57 (1988).  
 244 562 U.S. 443, 453–55 (2011).  
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is a slippery element to prove in a courtroom, and the cost to a legitimate 
news organization would be devastating were a plaintiff to succeed despite 
the application of the heightened standard.250    
At the surface, the Sullivan line of cases may have minimized the ability of 
any particular public official to bring criminal or civil libel claims against 
news media organizations covering civil rights movements.  However, this 
would not prevent group libel from being used as a government-wielded 
bludgeon against anti-racist or anti-fascist groups today.  Such a suit would 
merely require a complainant by any other name.  Fear of any criminal libel 
law in the hands of the government stems from a broader fear than the 
acknowledgement of a government’s inability to withstand criticism that 
underlies Sullivan.  In addition to protecting itself through censorship, the 
government as an entity (rather than an individual) could equally act as a 
harbinger of hate if given prosecutorial power over which groups in society 
require the protection of the law.  
This is partly to blame on the fact that oppression and defamation are 
readily reversible before the law.  In Sullivan, it was asserted that the 
advertisement published by the Times “echoed prevailing stereotypes of the 
South as a racist, backward, and violent place,”251 and while the plaintiffs in 
the case were indeed individual public officials, the advertisement was 
equally viewed as a defamation of all citizens of Alabama.252  Furthermore, 
comparing these sentiments to the polarization of America today is only 
facilitated by the fact that the players are nearly the same as they were half a 
century ago.  The New York Times, as a publication, continues to irritate 
conservative groups, and has been attacked widely on the right for failing to 
remain “neutral” in its coverage of partisan issues.253  Conservative journalist 
 
dropping it throughout Trump groups and Trump forums and boy it spread like wildfire.”  All Tech 
Considered: We Tracked Down A Fake-News Creator In The Suburbs. Here’s What We Learned, NPR (Nov. 
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parody defense, for example, Hustler raises the issue of news that is so obviously fake that a 
reasonable person would recognize it as fake. The Supreme Court noted that this type of flexibility 
would be necessary to prevent enforcement against purveyors of political cartoons.  Hustler v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).  
 250 The ultimate question in civil cases becomes one of probability, luck and financing.  After Gertz, 
private plaintiffs need to show actual malice to receive punitive damages, and without financing or 
evidence of actual malice, litigation might prove to be too costly.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 339 (1974).  Meanwhile, a wealthy plaintiff with unlimited resources could have more 
leeway to litigate against an organization that he or she disliked.  Expanding civil libel doctrine 
would only further exacerbate these effects.  
 251 HALL, supra note 246, at 21–22.  
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James O’Keefe’s “Project Veritas” has made it its mission to catch the 
publication in inaccuracies or prejudices.  As an example, the project 
procured and released a “bust” video showing a Times editor explaining the 
difficulty in portraying the President in an unbiased light.254  
There are non-political examples of libel law’s double-sided nature as an 
instrument of social justice, as well, which reveal how dangerous a criminal 
group libel law might be in unintended hands.  In August of 2017, a 
conservative Christian media group, D. James Kennedy Ministries, filed a 
defamation lawsuit in Alabama against the Southern Poverty Law Center 
over “false and misleading descriptions of its services” published online.255  
The progressive legal group had implied that D. James Kennedy Ministries 
was a hate group because of its extreme anti-LGBT rhetoric.256  This reality 
ultimately demonstrates that the Madisonian conception of democratic 
governance may only treat one form of government mistrust, beyond its 
tendency to control speech for self-perpetuation.  Rather, it is a different form 
of mistrust—the recognition that government officials are human and thus 
equally susceptible to bias and misinformation—that would render group 
libel an ineffectual solution to non-political fake news. 
Finally, as would be the case with nearly any criminal law involving 
speech, the chilling effects associated with a resuscitation of Beauharnais today 
would be a hidden but profound cost to bear.  It is easier to answer questions 
about the constitutionality and functionality of a group libel solution to fake 
news than to predict how the public would understand a law that appears to 
regulate offense and bias.  Real and disputed issues touching on ethnicity, 
race, and religion need the sanitizing effects of discussion, perhaps even more 
so than any other, given their sensitivity.  It is possible that even a narrowly 
tailored group libel law might suffice to create a perceived ban on offense, 
and accidentally deter this ever-important discourse.    
Yet, in application, it is unclear where, how, or to what degree chilling 
effects should figure into a First Amendment analysis, given their ephemeral 
nature.257  Put simply, “[t]he chilling effect doctrine recognizes the fact that 
 
 254 Id.  
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the legal system is imperfect and mandates the formulation of legal rules that 
reflect our preference for errors made in favor of free speech.”258  Of course, 
this brings the analysis back to where it started, with calculation of value to 
harm and an open directive to protect the freedom of the internet because 
we have never known it any other way.259  
CONCLUSION 
As the Packingham majority fervently acknowledged, the unregulated and 
decentralized environment that incubated social media has been hailed as a 
reason behind its success as a universally dominant news platform.260  Yet, 
this same environment can also be blamed for its corruptibility as a 
communicative tool.261  The American public’s failure to anticipate or detect 
fake news online is evidence that, especially where money is to be made, 
technology evolves at a faster rate than human psychology and sociology.  
Previous campaigns to develop an informed citizenry in the face of 
technologically accelerated misinformation, like the “Public Interest 
Theory,” reflected a quest to institutionalize the ideals put forth in First 
Amendment values like democratic discourse and the marketplace of ideas.  
“During the 1940s and 1950s, educators and researchers devoted 
considerable attention to developing thinking skills within the general 
public,” through propaganda awareness groups, literary and debating 
societies, and even regulatory schemes like the fairness doctrine.262  
Meanwhile, despite rising public concern about fake news today, 
Americans have yet to even agree on the precise nature of the problem.263  
In absence of organic cultural change, the question of government 
intervention has become a hot topic for debate.  Although an active solution 
like group libel has been proposed and rejected here as an inappropriate 
remedy for defamatory non-political fake news, more passive alternatives like 
inoculation and tolerance seem equally unrealistic in the face of growing 
mistrust of fact-based reasoning as a whole.  
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Part of this problem may be one of linguistics: the term “fake news” 
covers a broad range of journalistic forms, from the clickbait and reckless 
unverified reporting that have primarily been the subject of this inquiry, to 
the more ubiquitous category of news that President Donald Trump does not 
like.264  As a consequence, the term “fake news” is now wielded globally by 
authoritarian rulers seeking to undermine trust in all institutions, but 
particularly any media that contradicts them.265  This analysis has explored 
how government mistrust should be a warning bell for any criminal censorial 
power, particularly in an already polarized society.  
The problem is larger than an attempt to crush criticism, however.  
Embedded in the Trump Administration’s campaign to erode faith in 
“mainstream media,” conflation of any and all critical content with “fake 
news,” is a call to retreat from Madisonian democratic ideals and Holmes’ 
marketplace of ideas altogether.266  Arguments about the merits of a 
government-administered solution to fake news versus a citizen-administered 
one seem futile in this context, where truth is altogether irrelevant.267  
Furthermore, the foundational principles of free speech in America are 
perhaps too abstract to serve the purposes of already vulnerable ethnic, 
racial, and religious groups who face other challenges beyond the daily swell 
of defamatory online content from travel bans at the border268 to the threat 
of police brutality in their own neighborhoods.269  
The First Amendment may overestimate the human capacity to resist 
clickbait that promises to soothe deep-seated insecurities and peddle in 
comforting stereotypes.  It may fail to discern that within its aim of 
constraining government as a whole, it cannot control for the fallibility of the 
individuals who compose it.  However, that does not mean that the pursuit 
 
 264 Id. at 10; Tamara Keith, President Trump’s Description of What’s ‘Fake’ Is Expanding, NPR (Sept. 2, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/02/643761979/president-trumps-description-of-whats-fake-is-
expanding (noting that even Trump himself has admitted tacitly that his definition of “fake” 
includes any negative reporting about himself).  
 265 FINKEL ET AL., supra note 56, at 10. 
 266 Steven Erlanger, ‘Fake News,’ Trump’s Obsession, Is Now a Cudgel for Strongmen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/europe/trump-fake-news-
dictators.html?_r=0. 
 267 Amy Wang, ‘Post-truth’ Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-named-
2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries/?utm_term=.08ae1269b859. (“‘I have never been a 
fan of the word ‘post-truth,’ since it’s a facile way to describe basic human behavior since the first 
words were spoken,’ The Fact Checker’s Glenn Kessler said in an email.  ‘People have always been 
swayed by emotions and personal beliefs.  As fact checkers, we give people the factual information 
and context for statements made by politicians.  What people do with those facts is up to them.’”). 
 268 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).  
 269 Cassandra Chaney & Ray V. Robertson, Racism and Police Brutality in America, 17 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 
480 (2013) (investigating how the public generally perceive police and how race and racism shape 
this discourse). 
1348 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
   
 
of truth is not an intellectual guidepost worth striving for.  Particularly if we 
cannot rely on the State in this pursuit, we must take it on ourselves as 
individual members of diverse, but ever-threatened communities. 
 
